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Articles
THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE
SARA K. RANKIN*
Belonging is a fundamental human need, but human instincts are
Janus-faced and equally strong is the drive to exclude. This exclusive impulse, which this Article calls “the influence of exile,”
reaches beyond interpersonal dynamics when empowered groups
use laws and policies to restrict marginalized groups’ access to
public space. Jim Crow, Anti-Okie, and Sundown Town laws are
among many notorious examples. But the influence of exile perseveres today: it has found a new incarnation in the stigmatization
and spatial regulation of visible poverty, as laws that criminalize
and eject visibly poor people from public space proliferate across
the nation. These laws reify popular attitudes toward visible poverty, harming not only the visibly poor but also society as a whole.
This Article seeks to expose and explain how the influence of exile
operates; in doing so, it argues against the use of the criminal justice system as a response to visible poverty. In its place, this Article argues for more effective and efficient responses that take as
their starting point an individual right to exist in public space,
which for many visibly poor people is tantamount to a right to exist
at all.
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INTRODUCTION
True compassion is more than flinging a coin to a beggar. It comes
to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring.1
Concepts of inclusion and exile—that is, whether one earns permission
to participate as a recognized part of society or should be distanced from it—
are at the core of human thought and motivation.2 The exclusive side of this
pervasive phenomenon, which this Article calls “the influence of exile,” often drives the regulation and restriction of the rights of the most vulnerable
members of society.3 However, legal discourse and decisionmaking do not
1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Manhattan’s Riverside Church: Beyond Vietnam—A
Time to Break Silence (Apr. 4, 1967) (a year to the day before he was assassinated).
2. See Naomi I. Eisenberger et al., Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of Social Exclusion,
302 SCI. 290 (2003) (examining the painfulness of ostracism); Lisa Zadro et al., How Low Can You
Go? Ostracism by a Computer is Sufficient to Lower Self-Reported Levels of Belonging, Control,
Self-Esteem, and Meaningful Existence, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 560, 567 (2004) (concluding people are negatively impacted by rejection even if they know their exclusion comes from
a random computerized algorithm); Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong:
Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL.
497, 497–529 (1995) (observing that a sense of belonging is a fundamental human need).
3. Public opinion has been shown to influence both legislative policymaking and judicial decisionmaking. See Paul Burnstein, The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and
an Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29 (2003) (discussing the relationship between public opinion and
policymaking); Hans Kelsen, On the Basis of Legal Validity, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 178 (1981) (observing
that criminal laws are primarily a codification of social norms and are thus justified by reference to
common social beliefs); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal
Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169 (1996)
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sufficiently account for it. The human drive to exile is perhaps most clearly
expressed when empowered groups restrict access to public space through
legal4 or extra-legal5 means. American history shows a persistent commitment to exiling “undesirable” people from public space: Jim Crow, AntiOkie, and Sundown Town laws are among many notorious examples.6
Another increasingly popular and deleterious manifestation of the urge
to exile persists today: the proliferation of laws and policies that effectively
banish visibly poor people from urban centers.7 For purposes of this Article,
the term “visibly poor” and related iterations encompass individuals currently
experiencing homelessness, but also include individuals experiencing poverty in combination with housing instability, mental illness, or other psychological or socioeconomic challenges that deprive them of reasonable alternatives to spending all or the majority of their time in public.8 Similarly, the
hallmark of homelessness is a lack of private seclusion, so people experiencing homelessness endure conditions of persistent, nearly inescapable visibility.9 As explained below, evidence of human struggle or desperation commonly provokes fear, annoyance, disgust, or anger from those who witness
it.10 Thus, people experiencing homelessness and visibly poor people are
(establishing the influence of public opinion on Supreme Court jurisprudence). Public opinion also
influences the enactment of laws that impact commonly marginalized and stigmatized groups such
as racial minorities, immigrants, members of the LGBTQ community, and homeless individuals.
See David Leonhardt & Alicia Parlapiano, Why Gun Control and Abortion Are Different from Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (June 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/upshot/why-gun-control-and-abortion-are-different-from-gay-marriage.html?_r=0 (synthesizing Pew
Research Center and Gallup poll data on changes over time regarding social views of equality relating to various marginalized groups and concluding “public opinion and legal changes fed on each
other”); Javier Ortiz & Matthew Dick, SEATTLE UNIV. HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT,
The Wrong Side of History: A Comparison of Modern and Historical Criminalization Laws (Sara
K. Rankin ed., 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602533 (reviewing historical and contemporary efforts to purge marginalized groups from public space, including correlations between legal developments and public opinion); see also Marie-Eve Sylvestre & Céline Bellot, Challenging Discriminatory and Punitive Responses to Homelessness in Canada, in ADVANCING SOCIAL RIGHTS IN
CANADA (Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter eds., 2014) (observing that “punitive responses to homelessness were largely based on negative stereotyping, prejudices, and discrimination”). The relationship between popular societal attitudes and perceptions, and the development of laws and policies is also implicated in discussions of institutional discrimination. See, e.g., EDWARD ROYCE,
POVERTY & POWER: THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 17 (2009) (discussing how discrimination is largely a structural problem since “these obstacles . . . originate from the combined
workings of the economic, political, cultural, and social systems”).
4. Legal means may include contemporary homeless criminalization laws or historical exclusion laws. See infra Part III.
5. Examples of extra-legal means include the government-sponsored provision of one-way
bus tickets to take homeless people out of town or the use of “hostile architecture.” See infra Part
III.C.
6. Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3.
7. See infra note 17.
8. See, e.g., Joel Blau, The Visible Poor: Homelessness in the United States (1993).
9. See generally id.
10. See Part I.A–C; Part IV.
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particularly vulnerable to the influence of exile precisely because of their visibility and sustained occupation of public space.11 Such battles for tactical
control of public space are fueled by the influence of exile—deeply ingrained
class and status distinctions—that can inconspicuously, even unconsciously
undermine the constitutional, civil, and human rights of visibly poor people.
Despite America’s disturbing heritage of exiling marginalized groups
from public space, contemporary legal discourse largely ignores such analogies when laws and policies similarly marginalize poor or homeless people.
This Article contends that discrimination, stereotypes, and bias fuel the enactment and enforcement of laws and policies that regulate and restrict visibly poor people from public space; however, these laws are not commonly
understood as discriminatory. Instead, legal and popular discourse often legitimates these laws through narratives that blame poor people for their poverty, associate them with criminality, or accept as unassailable the purported
interests of public safety or public health. A better understanding of the influence of exile should prompt a re-examination of such laws and policies
that not only push poor people to the literal fringes of society, but also condemn them to stay there.
This Article is organized in four parts. Part I introduces the influence
of exile in the context of societal perceptions of the visibly poor. This Section
surveys sociological and psychological studies that clearly establish the human instincts to organize, include, and exclude each other, especially around
perceived status and class lines.12 This Section suggests that common stereotypes and prejudices can influence societal judgments regarding one’s worthiness13 and, in turn, these perceptions not only affect the restrictions of
rights and resources of poor people in general but visibly poor people in particular.14
Part II examines interdisciplinary definitions and perceptions of public
space as a stage for the influence of exile. This Section examines questions
11. Joel Blau explains:
[P]ublic displays of poverty are somehow improper. Since only the most desperate people exhibit their poverty, the slightest glimpse of their desperation makes others feel uneasy. Witnesses to homelessness then become like the unwilling spectators of an intimate
domestic quarrel. They know these things occur, but firmly believe they should be kept
private if at all possible.
BLAU, supra note 8, at 4.
12. See generally SUSAN T. FISKE, ENVY UP, SCORN DOWN: HOW STATUS DIVIDES US (2011)
(discussing a wide range of scholarship and studies).
13. See generally id.; see also Mina Cikara et al., On the Wrong Side of the Trolley Track:
Neural Correlates of Relative Social Valuation, 5 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE
404 (2010) (discussing the types of harm that come from economically well-off people who determine that a homeless person’s life is not worth as much as a higher class person’s life).
14. Burnstein, supra note 3; Carolyn J. Tompsett et al., Homelessness in the United States:
Assessing Changes in Prevalence and Public Opinion, 1993–2001, 37 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOL. 47 (2006) (explaining that the views of domiciled individuals influence social and legal
policy).
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such as what is public space? Who should have access? Who gets to decide
the scope and terms of access? What do these inquiries mean for democratic
principles, diversity, tolerance, and social justice? These inquiries reveal disquieting tensions in American constructions and valuations of public space.
Part III connects our societal attitudes toward the poor with contests
over public space, surveying the increasing prevalence and popularity of laws
that regulate the presence of poor people in public space. These spatial-hierarchical responses to visible poverty not only raise legal and policy concerns,15 but they have been shown to be ineffective and more expensive than
the provision of non-punitive alternatives, such as social services and affordable housing.16 Still, many jurisdictions continue to favor laws and policies
of exclusion to mitigate visible evidence of poverty, such as the removal of
homeless people from public space through the use of “move along” warnings, civil infractions, or incarceration.17
Part IV contends that the influence of exile must be better understood
and confronted as a matter of public awareness, and particularly as a matter
of law and policy. Many non-legal disciplines confront the influence of exile,
but legal discourse, by contrast, fails to adequately account for its impact on
the rights of visibly poor people. The influence of exile on the regulation of
public space has profoundly negative impacts, not only on the visibly poor
but also on society as a whole. This Section argues for the reconceptualization of the presence and integration of homeless and visibly poor people as
vital to American democratic principles and the revitalization of truly public
space.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE: HOW WE PERCEIVE THE VISIBLY POOR
Status is everywhere . . . . This process is so basic that we automatically judge the dominance of another individual in a fraction
of a second, using certain cues, such as physical strength. . . . All

15. See NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES (2014), http://nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place [hereinafter NAT’L LAW CTR.]; Justin Olson & Scott MacDonald, SEATTLE
UNIV. HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, Washington’s War on the Visibly Poor: A Survey
of Criminalizing Ordinances & Their Enforcement (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602318; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (holding that a state cannot
punish a person for his or her status). Following Robinson, the Court invalidated a Texas law criminalizing homosexual acts through anti-sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
16. NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Josh Howard & David Tran, SEATTLE UNIV. HOMELESS
RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, At What Cost: The Minimum Cost of Criminalizing Homelessness in
Seattle & Spokane (Sara K. Rankin ed. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602530.
17. See, e.g., NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; MARINA
FISHER ET AL., UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC,
CALIFORNIA’S NEW VAGRANCY LAWS: THE GROWING ENACTMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF ANTIHOMELESS LAWS IN THE GOLDEN STATE (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2558944.
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known organizations gravitate toward status and power hierarchies because this structure makes them run more smoothly. At the
macro level, human societies stratify social groups by dominance
hierarchies, especially social class.18
Common perceptions of poor people can fuel their marginalization.
Poverty is relative; in America, income inequality shapes American society
in significant ways. Different measures of wealth or poverty correlate to different outcomes concerning health,19 housing,20 transportation,21 education,22
water,23 and of course, the law.24 Differential allocations of rights and resources are no accident. Empowered groups, which control access to political and financial resources, also control decisions about the allocation of

18. FISKE, supra note 12, at 26.
19. See, e.g., Annie Lowery, Income Gap, Meet the Longevity Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/business/income-gap-meet-the-longevity-gap.html
(discussing the relationship between income disparity and health); Brenda Major & Laurie O’Brien,
The Social Psychology of Stigma, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 393 (2005) (observing the relationship
between social belonging and health); Neil Schneiderman et al., Stress and Health: Psychological,
Behavioral, and Biological Determinants, 1 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 607 (2005) (observing
the relationship between social belonging, psychosocial stressors, and health).
20. See, e.g., Rajini Vaidyanathan, Why Don’t Black and White Americans Live Together?,
BBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35255835 (discussing
trends in housing segregation and noting that across the nation, “people of other races simply don’t
mix, not through choice but circumstance. And if there’s no interaction between races, it’s harder
for conversations on how to solve race problems to even begin.”); William H. Frey, Census Shows
Modest Declines in Black-White Segregation, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 8, 2015, 11:00 AM),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2015/12/08-census-black-white-segregationfrey (observing that even modest declines in segregation “are still high measures—more than half
of blacks would need to move to achieve complete integration”).
21. See, e.g., Mike Maciag, Public Transportation’s Demographic Divide, GOVERNING: THE
STATES AND LOCALITIES (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-public-transportation-riders-demographic-divide-for-cities.html; Kirk Johnson, Targeting Inequality, This Time on Public Transit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/us/targeting-inequality-this-time-on-public-transit.html?_r=0.
22. See, e.g., NEIGHBORHOOD AND LIFE CHANCES: HOW PLACE MATTERS IN MODERN
AMERICA (Harriet Newburger et al. eds., 2011) (examining the impact of poverty and neighborhood
on a variety of measures, including educational attainment and equal opportunity).
23. Stephanie Pincetl & Terri S. Hogue, California’s New Normal? Recurring Drought: Addressing
Winners
and
Losers,
20
LOC.
ENV’T
850
(2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2015.1042778 (highlighting the widening gap of inequality between the wealthy and the poor of California, specifically in relation to the State’s current drought).
24. For example, poor people struggle with access to justice issues. See, e.g., Deborah L.
Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001) (examining the access to justice crisis).
Poverty is also likely to result in unequal treatment under the law when compared to legal outcomes
for more affluent defendants. See, e.g., GLENN GREENWALD, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR
SOME: HOW THE LAW IS USED TO DESTROY EQUALITY AND PROTECT THE POWERFUL 269 (2011)
(“The greater the disparities in wealth and power become, the more unequal the law becomes—and
the more unequal the law is, the more opportunities it creates for the wealthy and powerful to reinforce their advantages.”); MATT TAIBBI, THE DIVIDE: AMERICAN INJUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE
WEALTH GAP (2014) (exploring how “basic rights are now determined by our wealth or poverty”).
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rights and resources—even though these decisions clearly impact disempowered groups as well.25 Naturally, empowered groups cannot be assumed to
be disinterested in such decisions.26 Moreover, empowered groups’ perceptions of the social worth of disempowered groups influence these decisions.27
The relationship between power and rights informs many socio-political theories, which maintain that empowered groups consciously or unconsciously
use such power to reproduce class relations and hierarchies.28 Simply put,

25. See, e.g., Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 581 (1994) (discussing the danger of a tyrannical majority); Julian
N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1506, 1513–31 (1990) (discussing the popular belief that direct democracy is an authoritative expression of majority will and identifying significant problems associated with this conception); Stephen R. Munzer, Ellickson on
“Chronic Misconduct” in Urban Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squatters, and Day Laborers, 32
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 18–20 (1997) (discussing the ways the views and interests of the visible
poor are discounted in societal calculations of maximizing “public welfare”).
26. See generally JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1992) (examining
how institutional rules reflect the self-interested motivations of individuals, who perpetuate institutional structures that best serve their strategic interests). Many economic theories paint a stark portrait of self-interest, suggesting that people make decisions in order to maximize their wealth and
other material goals. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition,
and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. ECON. 817, 817 (1999); Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A
Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 247 (1980) (“Partly because there is
no common currency in which to compare happiness, sharing, and protection of rights, it is unclear
how to make the necessary trade-offs among these things in the design of a social system. Wealth
maximization makes the trade-offs automatically.”); see also Sanford Schram & Joe Soss, Demonizing the Poor, JACOBIN (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/09/welfare-republicans-sam-brownback-race-corporations/ (“Harsh restrictions on welfare don’t limit fraud and abuse.
They advance the interests of the rich and powerful.”). Of course, these assumptions are often
contradicted by examples where people prioritize social goals over economic self-interest. See, e.g.,
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 842–44, 854–56 (2009) (discussing
examples in the context of property law). Because disempowered people are, by definition, not an
actively engaged political majority, their preferences—whether driven by self-interest or not—do
not control the allocation of rights and resources. Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy
Representation in the American States, 40 AM. POL. RES. 29, 29 (2012) (concluding that lower
income individuals “receive little substantive political representation (compared to more affluent
citizens)”).
27. The allocation of resources based on social worth is often studied and critiqued in the context of economics and ethics. See, e.g., Advanced Application of Ethics: Types of Resource Allocation, UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN: ENGINEERING ETHICS, http://www.scs.illinois.edu/~eseebauer/ethics/Advanced/Allocation.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2016); see also CRIME,
DISORDER AND COMMUNITY SAFETY: A NEW AGENDA? (Roger Matthews & John Pitts eds., 2001).
Relatedly, social worth is also frequently examined under the rubric of distributive justice in philosophy and social sciences. See Linda J. Skitka & Faye J. Crosby, Trends in the Social Psychological Study of Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV., 282, 282–85 (2003). Distributive
justice may occur when individuals “get what they deserve,” a calculation based in part on norms
and an individual’s perceived worthiness according to those norms. See, e.g., Morton Deutsch,
Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be Used as the Basis of Distributive
Justice?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 137 (1975). As discussed infra, Part II, legal interpretations of social
worth—especially the allocations of rights relating to social worth—often manifest in doctrines of
property and constitutional law.
28. For more on the systemic reproduction of hierarchies, see, for example, PAULA S.
ROTHENBERG, RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES 593 (2007) (noting “the stere-
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the powerful generally stay powerful, the rich stay rich, and the poor stay
poor.29
A. Social Worthiness & Socio-Spatial Distance
The engine of this hierarchical system may be human psychology, plain
and simple. People perceive and organize each other through the formation
of powerful “in-groups” and marginalized “out-groups.” Powerful in-group
members may exclude people as “others” having undesirable attributes, thus
warranting their rejection from the accepted core of the in-group and their
placement on the margins.30 Commonly recognized out-groups include racial
or ethnic minorities,31 LGBTQ individuals,32 people with physical or mental
disabilities,33 as well as homeless and visibly poor people.34
These sorts of judgments demonstrate “social distancing,” a phenomenon well explained in social psychology. Social distancing examines “the
ways in which individual preferences, based in a person’s membership of
specific social in-groups, influence social relations with people from other
out-groups. These judgments are often measured along a continuum with

otypes and values transmitted through education and the media have played a critical role in perpetuating racism, sexism, hetero-sexism, and class privilege even at those times when the law has been
used as a vehicle to fight discrimination rather than maintain it”). Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and
Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 138 (2013) (arguing
that “racial wealth and housing disparities are dramatic and are probably best explained as a result
of systemic racial discrimination and related preferences”). For more on unconscious aspects of
structural discrimination, see Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a
New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (2000) (examining “organizational
activity that systematically harms minority groups even though the decision-making individuals
lack any conscious discriminatory intent”).
29. Income inequality is particularly pronounced along racial lines. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racialwealth-gaps-great-recession/ (documenting significant disparities in median household net worth
by race). Such structural inequalities relentlessly persist. See Ezra Rosser, supra note 28, at 134
(discussing the work of Professor Daria Roithmayr and others as “show[ing] how racial advantage
and disadvantage need not be tied to intentional discrimination; instead such advantages and disadvantages can remain stable because the effects of prior discrimination and related early advantages
get locked into place”).
30. See, e.g., FISKE, supra note 12, at 26; Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing
Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363 (2001).
31. See, e.g., SUSAN WELCH ET AL., RACE AND PLACE: RACE RELATIONS IN AN AMERICAN
CITY (2001).
32. See Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, “Some of My Best Friends”: Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbians, 22
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 412 (1996).
33. Elaine Makas, Getting in Touch: The Relationship Between Contact with and Attitudes
Toward People with Disabilities, in PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY 121 (Mark Nagler ed., 1993).
34. See, e.g., Barrett A. Lee et al., Revisiting the Contact Hypothesis: The Case of Public Exposure to Homelessness, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 40 (2004).
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nearness, intimacy, or familiarity at one end and farness, difference, and unfamiliarity at the other end.”35 Sociologist Georg Simmel famously advanced
the concept of a “stranger” as an archetype of social distancing: the stranger
often is perceived to transgress social norms and thus lives at the fringes of
society, wavering in and out of visibility at the periphery.36 Even when
strangers are physically near, they are perceived as “far.”37 In this respect,
social distancing is both a psychological and hierarchical act of organization,
reinforcing one’s perceptions of in-group and out-group membership. But
social distancing also reinforces the likelihood that one might form basic
emotional and moral associations, such as empathy, anger, disgust, or pity
for another based on perceived group membership.38 Higher degrees of social distance facilitate negative associations.39
Social distancing is not only a psychological phenomenon; it can also
manifest as a physical one. Social distancing is associated with increased

35. Darrin Hodgetts et al., ‘Near and Far:’ Social Distancing in Domiciled Characterisations
of Homeless People, 48 URB. STUD. 1739, 1740 (2011). Professor Paul Gorski translates years of
considerable research about stereotyping people in poverty:
Stereotypes grow, as well, from how we’re socialized. They are the result of what we
are taught to think about poor people, for instance, even if we are poor, through celebrations of “meritocracy” or by watching a parent lock the car doors when driving through
certain parts of town. They grow, as well, from a desire to find self-meaning by distinguishing between social and cultural groups with which we do and do not identify.
PAUL GORSKI, REACHING AND TEACHING STUDENTS IN POVERTY: STRATEGIES FOR ERASING THE
OPPORTUNITY GAP 57 (2013).
36. Georg Simmel, The Sociological Significance of the “Stranger”, in INTRODUCTION TO THE
SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY 322, 322–26 (R. Park & E. Burgess eds., 1921). For more on Simmel’s
theories of social distancing, see GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL (Kurt H.
Wolff ed., trans.,1950).
37. See, e.g., Donald Levine et al., Simmel’s Influence on American Sociology I, 81 AM. J.
SOC. 813 (1976) (explaining the tension between the near and far embodied in strangers).
38. FISKE, supra note 12, at 26 (discussing the association of these reactions based on perceptions of social worth). Stigma literature closely examines how in-groups assign stigma, a sort of
“spoiled identity that encourages their devaluation and rejection by ‘normal’ others.” Lee et al.,
supra note 34, at 42.
39. As Princeton psychologist Susan Fiske explains: “Distance has the effect of belittling people, making them appear smaller. Hence, keeping our distance should make it easier for us to look
down on other people. Indeed, it is easier to dehumanize someone at a distance. Scorn looks down
and distances.” FISKE, supra note 12, at 51 (footnote omitted).
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spatial distancing,40 such as the evolution of racially segregated neighborhoods and schools.41 Naturally, spatial distance depresses opportunities for
interaction among groups. Indeed, physical segregation may be either an unintended consequence or an explicit motivation associated with social distancing.42
Although social distancing may be a hard-wired human phenomenon, it
not only invites discrimination and compromise of the rights of perceived
40. Interdisciplinary scholarship in law and geography presumes a reciprocal relationship between the law and the spatial conception of social life. See, e.g., Austin Sarat et al., Where (or
What) Is the Place of Law? An Introduction, in THE PLACE OF LAW 1, 1–20 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.,
2003). For an excellent legal-spatial analysis applied to law regulating the presence of homeless
people in Seattle, see KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL
CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA (2010). Other scholars have documented the international application of spatial laws to marginalized groups by class and social status. See, e.g., Marie-Eve Sylvestre,
Disorder and Public Spaces in Montreal: Repression (and Resistance) Through Law, Politics, and
Police Discretion, 31 URB. GEOGRAPHY 803, 803 (2010) (surveying studies from the United States,
Canada, Western Europe, and South America). Stand your ground laws, frequently infused with
debates about racial discrimination, are one of many potential sites of inquiry about how proximity
in physical space, combined with bias, can influence discretionary decisions with potentially devastating consequences. See Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida’s Castle Doctrine
for the Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 536–37 (2007) (noting that Miami’s urbanization has exposed individuals to violence at a much closer proximity than when living
situations were more rural).
41. History is replete with examples of exclusionary laws that minimize the presence of “undesirable people” in public space. See, e.g., Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3. For more on the relationship between discrimination and current trends in racial segregation, see, for example, PAUL
JARGOWSKY, ARCHITECTURE OF SEGREGATION: CIVIL UNREST, THE CONCENTRATION OF
POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2015) (noting that discriminatory housing, zoning, and other policy
choices are driving a dramatic increase in racialized poverty and segregation across the U.S.);
DAVID SANCHEZ ET AL., AN OPPORTUNITY AGENDA FOR RENTERS: THE CASE FOR
SIMULTANEOUS INVESTMENTS IN RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AND LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES
(2015) (finding the “lack of available affordable housing and deeply rooted patterns of residential
segregation have created a situation in which where people live depends in large part on their income, race, and ethnicity”); Matthew Hall et al., Neighborhood Foreclosures, Racial/Ethnic Transitions, and Residential Segregation, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 527 (2015) (observing that racialized
segregation “fueled” the foreclosure crisis, which in turn, “may have significantly disrupted trajectories toward residential integration”); Gary Orfield et al., E Pluribus . . . Separation: Deepening
Double Segregation for More Students, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (Sept. 2012), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus separation-deepening-double-segregation-for-more-students/orfield_epluribus_revised_
omplete_2012.pdf (finding segregation has “increased dramatically” for Latino students and is a
persistent problem of “double segregation” by race and poverty for African-American students).
42. Jim Crow era segregationists were arguably transparent about the goal of physically separating the races. Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3, at 6–8. But the oppressive impacts of systemic discrimination are not always conscious choices; this observation is well-developed in literature concerning unconscious bias. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489
(2005); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision-making, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 359 (2007). The law accommodates the influence of unconscious
bias in race cases by allowing proof of intentional discrimination or discriminatory impact. See,
e.g., Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2525 (2015) (holding that, under the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff may establish disparate-impact
liability based on evidence of disproportionate impact instead of proof of intentional discrimination).
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out-groups, but it also comes at a significant cost to the personal growth and
understanding of in-group members. Socio-spatial distancing decreases interaction and integration among groups. However, contact theory shows that
contact between in-group and out-group members generally improves “the
attitudes of the former toward the latter by replacing in-group ignorance with
first-hand knowledge that disconfirms stereotypes.”43 In other words, socialspatial segregation further entrenches stereotyping, misunderstanding, and
the stigmatization of marginalized groups.44 Such self-perpetuating consequences of socio-spatial distancing are troubling.
B. The Special Stigma of Poverty
Socio-spatial instincts have particular significance when applied to societal perceptions of poor people. Of all commonly identified out-groups,
visibly poor and homeless people may be at the bottom of the chain. Social
neuroscientists confirm that today, society tends to regard homeless and visibly poor people with disgust and rejection at higher rates than people of any
other perceived status.45 Other studies consistently suggest that of all marginalized groups, homeless and visibly poor people are the most severely and
persistently stigmatized.46
43. Lee et al., supra note 34, at 40; see also Vaidyanathan, supra note 20 (discussing trends in
racial segregation).
44. For more on the process of stigmatization, see Link & Phelan, supra note 30; see also
Major & O’Brien, supra note 19.
45. See FISKE, supra note 12, at 131 (noting that “in the United States, by far the most extreme
out-group is homeless people, but drug addicts, welfare recipients, and immigrants, especially undocumented ones, are also among society’s default bad guys”); see also SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE:
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SOCIAL MIND 124 (Alexander Todorov
et al. eds., 2011) (describing how study participants “dehumanized [homeless people] as ill-intentioned, inept, unfamiliar, dissimilar, strange, and not uniquely human or quite typically human”);
Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low: Neuroimaging Responses
to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 848 (2006) (describing study results placing homeless people in the “lowest” category lacking warmth and competence, which “elicit the worst kind
of prejudice—disgust and contempt—based on perceived moral violations and subsequent negative
outcomes that these groups allegedly caused themselves”); Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Social Groups That Elicit Disgust Are Differentially Processed in mPFC, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE &
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 45 (2007) (finding study participants dehumanize homeless people as
stimuli that elicit “disgust”). Some scholars attribute these perceptions to negative stereotyping,
prejudices, and discrimination, often associated with moral judgments and assumptions that visibly
poor people are to blame for their condition. See, e.g., BLAU, supra note 8; see also Sylvestre &
Bellot, supra note 3. Sylvestre and Bellot describe common views of homeless people as “inferior,
lazy, and dishonest individuals (the ‘moral deprivation’ discourse), blamed for their own misfortunes (the ‘choice’ discourse), and are treated as criminals or potential serious offenders needing to
be repressed and confined rather than as equal citizens worthy of respect and consideration (the
‘criminality discourse’).” Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3, at 2.
46. See, e.g., FISKE, supra note 12 (reviewing various studies and concluding that societal disdain for the homeless and visibly poor is the most severe); see also Leon Anderson, David A. Snow
& Daniel Cress, Negotiating the Public Realm: Stigma Management and Collective Action Among
the Homeless, in RESEARCH IN COMMUNITY SOCIOLOGY: THE COMMUNITY OF THE STREETS 121
(Dan A. Chekki et al. eds., 1994) (documenting that homeless or visibly poor people are commonly
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But don’t just take the word of social scientists. America’s deep disdain
for poor people is commonly acknowledged in popular media as well. Celebrated Rolling Stone journalist and best-selling author of The Divide: American Injustice in the Age of the Wealth Gap, Matt Taibbi, recently declared
that Americans have “a profound hatred of the weak and the poor.”47 Linguist and philosopher Noam Chomsky apparently agrees, describing a “class
war” in a recent article, partly titled, America Hates Its Poor.48 Television
commentators frequently suggest that shaming and stigmatizing poverty is
vital to the national economy.49 Television producers commonly gamble on

not perceived as human beings); Jo Phelan et al., The Stigma of Homelessness: The Impact of the
Label “Homeless” on Attitudes Toward Poor Persons, 60 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 323, 334 (1997) (concluding that “homelessness is stigmatized more severely than poverty and, generally, more severely
than mental illness”). Of course, the intersectionality between homelessness and other marginalized
groups complicates the question of which perceived traits or out-group membership might trigger
negative associations of in-group members. For more on the intersectionality of homelessness and
other commonly stigmatized groups, see Kaya Lurie & Breanne Schuster, SEATTLE UNIV.
HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, Discrimination at the Margins: The Intersectionality of
Homelessness & Other Marginalized Groups (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602532.
47. Emily Tess Katz, Matt Taibbi: America Has a ‘Profound Hatred of the Weak and the
Poor’, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2014/04/16/matt-taibbi-the-divide_n_5159626.html.
48. Chris Steele, Noam Chomsky: America Hates Its Poor, SALON MEDIA GRP. (Dec. 1, 2013,
7:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/12/01/noam_chomsky_america_hates_its_poor_ partner/.
49. Examples abound, but Fox News provides a prolific showcase. On a recent edition of Fox
Business’s Varney & Co. at Night, Stuart Varney reflected on his earlier statement that “99.6% of
[poor people] have a refrigerator.” Varney opined, “[t]he image we have of poor people as starving
and living in squalor really is not accurate. Many of them have things, what they lack is the richness
of spirit.” Media Matters Staff, Fox’s Stuart Varney on the Poor: “Many of Them Have Things—
What They Lack Is the Richness of Spirit”, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Aug. 25, 2011, 9:56 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/video/2011/08/25/foxs-stuart-varney-on-the-poor-many-of-themhav/138530. On America’s Newsroom, Fox Business host Charles Payne alleged that federal benefit programs trap people in poverty and complained that there wasn’t enough “stigma” directed at
poor Americans for using food assistance programs: “I know there’s a big thing trying to de-stigmatize food stamps, but the good part about the stigma is it actually does serve as an impetus to get
people off of it. . . . They’re trying to take that stigma away.” Media Matters Staff, Fox’s Charles
Payne Laments Lack of “Stigma” Surrounding Food Stamps, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Mar. 28,
2013, 10:29 AM), http://mediamatters.org/video/2013/03/28/foxs-charles-payne-laments-lack-ofstigma-surro/193311. Similarly, in a recent segment of Fox News’ Happening Now, Fox Business
co-contributor Charles Gasparino explained that he wished more stigma was attached to welfare.
Craig Harrington, Fox’s Gasparino Calls Public Pensions “Ponzi Schemes,” Wishes More
“Stigma” Was Attached to Welfare, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Aug. 21, 2014, 4:39 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/blog/2014/08/21/foxs-gasparino-calls-public-pensions-ponzi-sche/200506.
New York Post columnist Michael Goodwin recently lamented that “the sense of shame is gone”
from enrolling in government anti-poverty programs. See Noah Rothman, NY Post Columnist:
‘Sense of Shame is Gone’ for Entitlement Recipients, MEDIATE, L.L.C. (May 21, 2012, 9:45 AM),
http://www.mediaite.com/tv/ny-post-columnist-sense-of-shame-is-gone-for-entitlement-recipients/.
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the popularity of so-called “poverty porn,” which entertains through the spectacle of poor people enduring hardships, all for the viewing pleasure of the
public.50
Contemporary politics also demonstrate an appetite for stigmatizing the
poor.51 Recently, an Oklahoman political party compared food stamp recipients to wild animals.52 Maine placed a cap on the savings accounts of food
stamp recipients, a move some criticized as discouraging poor people from
saving money.53 Wisconsin recently passed a so-called “food nanny” bill,54
prohibiting food stamp recipients from buying a long list of staple food items,
including beans, spaghetti sauce, and nuts.55 Further, Wisconsin joined many
other states in requiring applicants for most state benefits to submit to drug
screening, despite strong evidence that welfare recipients have a lower positive test rate for illicit drug use than the general population.56 Several states

50. A recent but controversial and short-lived example was CBS’s The Briefcase. See, e.g.,
Douglas Cobb, ‘The Briefcase’ Takes Poverty Porn to ‘Hunger Games’ Level, GUARDIAN LIBERTY
VOICE (May 31, 2015), http://guardianlv.com/2015/05/the-briefcase-takes-poverty-porn-to-hungergames-level/; Dave Broome, Creator of ‘The Briefcase,’ Says Show Is Not ‘Poverty Porn’,
HUFFINGTON POST, (June 25, 2015, 5:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/25/thebriefcase_n_7666440.html.
51. GREENWALD, supra note 24, at 14 (“It is now quite common for American political discourse to include arguments expressly justifying the elites’ legal impunity and openly calling for
radically different treatment under the law for various classes of people based on their power, status,
and wealth.”).
52. The Facebook page on the “Oklahoma Republican Party” website, which has since been
removed, criticized what it described as an increase in the distribution of food stamps, noting that
“[m]eanwhile, the National Park Service . . . , asks us ‘Please Do Not Feed the Animals.’ Their
stated reason for the policy is because ‘[t]he animals will grow dependent on handouts and will not
learn to take care of themselves.’ . . . Thus ends today’s lesson in irony.” Steve Benen, State GOP
Equates Food-Stamp Recipients, Wild Animals, MSNBC.COM (July 14, 2015, 7:14 PM),
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/state-gop-equates-food-stamp-recipients-wild-animals?cid=sm_fb_maddow.
53. Roberto A. Ferdman, How Maine Will Punish the Poor for Trying to Save Money, WASH.
POST (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/how-maine-will-punish-the-poorfor-trying-to-save-money/ar-AAeZLls?li=AAa0dzB&ocid=wispr.
Maine pursued these restrictions despite the fact that the state’s “poor timeliness” in processing food stamps applications
prompted the United States Department of Agriculture to threaten the state with penalties. Alan
Pyke, Feds Threaten Maine with Big Fines over Food Stamps, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 16, 2015,
9:19 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2015/12/16/3732595/maine-food-stamps-processingfine/.
54. The bill became known as the “food nanny bill,” presumably for its paternalistic approach
to managing the food purchases of the poor. See “Food Nanny” Bill Comes up for Vote,
WXERFM.COM (May 13, 2015, 8:17 AM), http://wxerfm.com/news/articles/2015/may/13/foodnanny-bill-comes-up-for-vote/.
55. Assemb. B. 117, 2015–2016 Leg., 102nd Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015), http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2015/related/proposals/ab177.
56. Bryce Covert, Wisconsin Begins Drug Testing for Unemployment and Food Stamp Applicants, Which May Be Illegal, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 9, 2015, 10:59 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2015/11/09/3720495/wisconsin-begin-drug-tests/; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 49.79
(West 2015).
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cap eligibility for welfare based on the number of people per family to discourage poor women from having children, despite evidence that families
receiving welfare are no larger than those in the general public and that such
caps actually exacerbate poverty.57 Critics contend such regulations are expensive and ineffective and instead primarily serve to punish poor people for,
well, being poor.58 Ultimately, such punitive constructions codify and legitimize the instinct to condemn people for their poverty.
C. Poverty and the Transmutation of Discrimination
Given the disproportionate representation of other various marginalized
groups within poor and homeless populations, the higher rate of negativity
associated with poverty—as opposed to other commonly stigmatized traits—
is curious. Studies show visible poverty elicits higher rates of disgust than
nearly any other commonly marginalized trait, including racial or ethnic indicia.59 But poverty is more likely to be associated with racial minorities,
people with physical and mental disabilities, and single-female-headed families.60 Similarly, homeless populations are disproportionately comprised of
these and other commonly marginalized groups.61 The special stigma reserved for poor and homeless people, then, seems at odds with such evidence
of intersectionality. Why does viewing people through the lens of poverty
trigger especially negative reactions?
Perhaps this special stigma serves as a sort of release valve for the contemporary American conscience: as many forms of discrimination find less
space in a normative framework, the stigmatization of poverty may present
an attractive path of less resistance.62 National public opinion seems to accept the normative proposition that (at least overt) discrimination on the basis
57. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04 (West 1994); see also Bryce Covert, An
‘Ugly Policy’ Systematically Devalues Poor Children. One State Is Ready to Stop It.,
THINKPROGRESS
(July
1,
2015,
8:00
AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2015/07/01/3675655/california-family-cap/.
58. See, e.g., KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011) (discussing the criminalization of welfare); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009) (discussing laws
and policies that punish and marginalize poor people); JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR:
NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE (2011) (cataloguing the systemic oppression and regulation of the poor).
59. See supra note 45. Indeed, neurological studies suggest that people demonstrate higher
degrees of support or tolerance for racial minorities that show indicia of higher socioeconomic status. FISKE, supra note 12.
60. Lurie & Schuster, supra note 46 (examining the disproportionate representation of various
marginalized groups in poor and homeless populations when compared to the general population).
61. Id. (examining the disproportionate representation of various marginalized groups, such as
racial minorities, in homeless populations when compared to the general population).
62. SOSS ET AL., supra note 58, at 55 (noting the gradual morphing of poverty governance:
“[M]arginalization itself does not have a static relationship to race, class, gender, or other axes of
social division.”).
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of race, ability, or sexual orientation and identity is wrong—or that it is supposed to be.63 The Black Lives Matter movement; continuing battles over
women’s reproductive rights; disputes over the relationship between immigration, religion, and national security; and the fight for marriage equality are
just a few examples of struggles that continue to clarify the contours of America’s commitment to diversity, inclusion, and social justice. These high-visibility debates certainly do not reflect a national consensus around racism,
sexism, or xenophobia; however, at least they register in the American conscience.64
Of course, the American conscience cannot and should not be oversimplified. The passage of civil rights and anti-discrimination laws does not
moot the existence of overt or implicit bias against protected groups. In fact,
some persuasively contend that such laws stand as testaments to the continuing crises of discrimination.65 However, studies suggest the American public
63. See SOSS ET AL., supra note 58, at 54 (noting that “[e]galitarian racial norms are now
widely promoted, and explicit racism is rarely tolerated in the discourses of the market and polity”);
Steve Holland, Most Americans Side With Gays in Religious Freedom Disputes: Reuters/Ipsos Poll,
REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2015, 9:13 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/09/us-usa-religionpoll-idUSKBN0N00A720150409 (discussing poll supporting marriage equality for LGBTQ individuals); Sara K. Rankin, Invidious Deliberation: The Problem of Congressional Bias in Federal
Hate Crime Legislation, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (2014) (discussing legislative evidence of the
relationship between public opinion, overtly expressed views of perceived social worth by legislators, and laws that support or protect these marginalized groups).
64. Maggie Haberman, Poll: Anti-Discrimination Law Support, POLITICO (Sept. 30, 2013,
5:05 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/poll-big-support-for-anti-discrimination-law097540. Hate crime protections are commonly afforded to marginalized groups, except for the
visible poor. See Sara K. Rankin, A Homeless Bill of Rights (Revolution), 45 SETON HALL L. REV.
383 (2015) (comparing congressional allocations of hate crime protections on the basis of race,
ethnicity, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and homelessness). Many
marginalized groups, but not the poor, are considered suspect or quasi-suspect classes worthy of
heightened judicial scrutiny. See Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization
of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2008) (reviewing suspect classification analyses with various marginalized groups and arguing that the classification of the poor is still unsettled). Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3, at 1, 4 (arguing that homelessness should be recognized as a protected class under Canadian law because, among other
reasons, “it is, like several other enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination, a social construct attached to some individuals that is not immutable, but that is difficult to change”). Another
example of legal recognition afforded commonly marginalized groups (but not the visibly poor, at
least so far) is disparate impact analysis under Equal Protection theories. Most recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the availability of disparate impact analysis on the basis of race in Texas
Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507 (2015). In this case, the plaintiffs argued that the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs distributed federal tax credits for low-income housing in a way that disproportionately
affected minorities. Id. at 2514. The Supreme Court considered whether the language of the Fair
Housing Act, which makes it illegal to refuse to sell, rent, or “otherwise make unavailable or deny”
a property because of race and other categories, required that the discrimination be intentional or
whether it permitted plaintiffs to claim a discriminatory effect, regardless of intent. Id. at 2518.
The Court held that the Act permitted disparate impact claims. Id.
65. The prevalence of unconscious bias is well-established. See, e.g., King’s Dream Remains
an Elusive Goal; Many Americans See Racial Disparities, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (Aug. 22,
2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/08/22/kings-dream-remains-an-elusive-goal-many-
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is growing more aware of how unconscious bias might be perceived by others, which may make people more reflective regarding overt expressions of
discrimination. Still, this awareness could result in the expression of more
subtle and nuanced—but still potent and damaging—forms of discrimination.
In other words, reductions in overt expressions of bias might suggest that
people are learning to outwardly censor their implicit biases with respect to
race and gender, and perhaps increasingly, with respect to sexual orientation
and identity. Racial Attitudes in America, an annual survey conducted since
1997, reports that “the survey data on white racial attitudes shows improvement, stagnation, or decline” in American attitudes about race.66 The principal researchers recently observed that:
[Q]uestions of how much social distance whites prefer to keep
from blacks, and the extent to which whites endorse negative stereotypes of blacks, also show clear evidence of improvement:
fewer and fewer white Americans readily endorse statements that
blacks are less intelligent and hardworking than whites; and fewer
verbally object to interracial mixing in neighborhoods and in marriage partners. . . . [T]here is a need for some caution in interpreting the trends from these kinds of questions because they do not
capture all aspects of racial attitudes and because some of the liberalizing trend may be due to changes in social norms about what
kinds of answers should be reported in surveys. . . . This in itself
reflects a change in the racial climate in this country even if it does
not reflect changes in the hearts and minds of white Americans.67
And so, perhaps many forms of discrimination are improving; perhaps they
are simply evolving and growing more sophisticated.
But in the context of poverty, discrimination is still largely unrecognized
as discrimination.68 Americans commonly disregard evidence that racism,
able-ism, sexism, and homophobia are major contributors to poverty and

americans-see-racial-disparities/; see also Eben Harrell, Study: Racist Attitudes Are Still Ingrained,
TIME (Jan. 8, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1870408,00.html. According to Harrell, “The authors say the results suggest attitudes so deeply ingrained that protective
legislation and affirmative-action programs are required to overcome them. The results may even
offer clues as to how other societies have spiraled into genocide.” Id.; see Kerry Kawakami et al.,
Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral Responses to Racism, 323 SCIENCE 276 (2009).
66. See Maria Krysan & Sarah Moberg, Trends in Racial Attitudes: A Portrait of African American and White Racial Attitudes, UNIV. OF ILL. (Sept. 9, 2016), http://igpa.uillinois.edu/sites/igpa.uillinois.edu/files/reports/A-Portrait-of-Racial-Attitudes.pdf.
67. Id.
68. A majority of Americans report negative views of homeless and visibly poor people, associating them with moral weaknesses, disorderly conduct, or bad choices that warrant their misfortunes. See discussion and notes supra Part I.B. The increasing popularity of homeless criminalization laws are just one example of the codification of discrimination and exile based on the low
perceived social worth of the visibly poor. Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3.
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homelessness,69 and instead, embrace the belief that poor people are to blame
for their own conditions.70 Punitive treatment of poor people on account of
their poverty does not warrant the same legislative or judicial protections afforded to many other marginalized groups.71 Somehow, as further illustrated
below, constructions of the poor as less worthy—as expressed in popular media, in political circles, or even in the enactment or enforcement of laws and
policies that target or disproportionately impact poor people—do not generate the same level of societal introspection or caution.72 But given the intersectionality of poverty, homelessness, and other marginalized traits, this phenomenon may simply represent the transmutation of normatively “bad”
discrimination into a normatively “more acceptable” form of discrimination
against the poor.73 Thus, through the special stigmatization of poverty, the
American conscience may be sanitizing many forms of discrimination to appear as something less objectionable or actionable: judgments about social
worthiness.74

69. Lurie & Schuster, supra note 46 (reviewing a range of studies).
70. See infra Part I.D.
71. See Nice, supra note 64, at 631–36 (contesting that judicial and legislative omissions of
the poor from legal protections results in a “dialogic default” where the constitutional rights of poor
people are neglected); see also Rankin, supra note 64 (comparing congressional deliberations over
hate crime protections for various marginalized groups compared to homeless people).
72. See generally Rankin, supra note 63 (discussing how homeless and visibly poor people are
largely omitted from state and federal antidiscrimination legislation that often protects other commonly marginalized groups from various forms of discrimination); id. (reviewing various but limited legislative efforts to advance homeless rights advocacy, including anti-discrimination legislation, across various United States and Puerto Rico). Certainly, the omission of poverty from suspect
classification analysis is another problematic expression of the relative social worth ranking of poor
people compared to other commonly marginalized groups. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 787 (1991) (noting that judicial
distinctions between “justifiable [and] unjustifiable disadvantaging quite plainly requires a substantive value choice”); Nice, supra note 64, at 631–36. Other overt calculations of the low social worth
of poor people are plentiful. See, e.g., Susan Schweik, Kicked to the Curb: Ugly Law Then and
Now, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 (2011) (describing a tension in Portland, Oregon, which
“capitalizes upon its image as an exceptionally livable, an extraordinarily progressive and tolerant
city, while at the same time consolidating systems of disgust, phobia, and abandonment used against
certain (non)members of the urban community”). Social worth calculations as a policy decisionmaking guide is illustrated in a recent statement by one Florida state senator, who explained his
support for cutting mental health funding: “When it comes to funding, an 85-year-old woman in a
nursing home matters more to me than a 45-year-old guy with a substance abuse problem . . . It’s
all about priorities.” Tia Mitchell, Senate Plan Includes Big Cuts to Mental Health Programs,
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012, 8:51 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/health/senate-planincludes-big-cuts-to-mental-health-programs/1215489.
73. See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, supra note 58, at 648 (“The criminalization of welfare recipients entails a long historical process of public discourse and welfare policies infused with race,
class, and gender bias.”).
74. Societal recognition of and response to evidence of discrimination against common outgroups—such as racial minorities, physically or mentally disabled individuals, LGBTQ individuals,
and women, for example—is so well established that a review of this extensive body of literature is
not necessary here. For a starting point, consider Rankin, supra note 64.
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D. The Blameworthy Poor
Judgments about social worthiness are closely tied to the construction
of blame. Public support or tolerance for certain groups may turn on the
degree to which society believes individuals are responsible for a particular
trait.75 This relationship between perceptions of causal responsibility and
perceptions of social worthiness resonates with traditional suspect classification analyses, which afford higher degrees of judicial scrutiny when a law
discriminates against a member of a suspect group who is marked by an involuntary trait that cannot be changed.76 In other words, the judiciary extends
such enhanced protection only to those who are not to blame for who they
are.77
Blame plays a significant role in Americans’ constructions of poverty.78
Compared to other countries, the United States is particularly enamored with
the “bootstrap” work ethic: the belief that, if you just work hard enough, you
can avoid poverty.79 Approximately a quarter of Americans believe the most
significant cause of income inequality is the failure of the poor to work as
hard as the more affluent.80 Accordingly, American sentiment might “urge
75. See Gail Sahar, On the Importance of Attribution Theory in Political Psychology, 8 SOC.
& PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 229, 229–49 (2014) (discussing how “[j]udgments of causal
responsibility . . . pervade our understanding of the social world,” poverty, and homelessness and
explaining that “perceptions of responsibility are linked to ideology and . . . influence policy attitudes”). Sahar calls for “increased communication among fields and a more systematic application
of attributional models to the study of political judgments.” Id. at 229; see also FISKE, supra note
12. The relationship between causal responsibility and social or legal judgments about worthiness
resonate with traditional suspect classification analyses, which afford higher degrees of judicial
scrutiny when a law has a discriminatory impact or intent on a “suspect” group that cannot change
a trait. Neurological studies suggest that people inherently have higher degrees of support or tolerance for certain racial minorities, especially when those racial minorities are of higher socioeconomic status. See id.; see also Census Data Shows Black Women and Children Impacted by Poverty
More, ELEC. URB. REP. (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.eurweb.com/2015/10/census-data-shows-blackwomen-and-children-impacted-by-poverty-more/.
76. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
77. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (striking down a statute
punishing individuals based on their status rather than conduct).
78. MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICA’S ENDURING CONFRONTATION
WITH POVERTY (2d ed. 2013) (explaining the role of blame and other related moral judgments in
Americans’ constructions of poverty). The visibly poor and homeless are particularly vulnerable to
this judgment. See, e.g., Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3. Homelessness is often “explained and
addressed as in individual moral failure rather than in relation to its structural causes, so that the
victims of economic changes leading to displacement or unemployment were blamed for their predicament, suspected of being a threat to society and likely to engage in serious criminality.” Id. at
10.
79. See, e.g., Bruce Stokes, Is Laziness the Cause of Economic Inequality? Americans and the
British Lean Toward Moral Weakness, but the Rest of the World Blames Government Policies,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 22, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/22/is-laziness-the-cause-of-economic-inequality/.
80. Most See Inequality Growing, But Partisans Differ Over Solutions, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/01/23/most-see-inequality-growing-but-partisans-differ-over-solutions/.
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pity for those who are worse off, and we do pity certain unfortunates, but
only those who have landed at the bottom through no fault of their own. Otherwise, under meritocracy, they deserve their fate and are beneath consideration.”81
Blame also plays into theories of property—that is, whether one’s work
and productivity justifies the acquisition or ownership of property. The labor-desert “principle rests on a conception of persons as agents who, by their
actions in the world, are responsible for changes in it and so deserve or are
entitled to something.”82 Placed in the context of poverty, the labor-desert
principle fits neatly with American attitudes: a poor person likely did something (like make bad decisions) or failed to do something (like work hard
enough) that caused his or her poverty. The labor-desert principle does not
account for institutional or structural discrimination that limits meaningful
opportunities, nor does it contemplate health or social conditions, such as
addiction or mental illness, which undercut the labor-desert calculation.
Thus, blame serves as a blunt but effective instrument, partitioning those who
deserve the benefits of full membership in society from those who have not
earned the privilege.83
E. The Criminal Poor
Blame also facilitates a host of other negative associations, commonly
expressed in the “broken windows theory,” a criminal justice framework that
equates visible, undesirable people with criminality.84 The broken windows
theory suggests that if a community fails to swiftly and adequately respond
to the first signs of disorder in a neighborhood, such as a broken window,
81. FISKE, supra note 12, at 27. Some scholars attribute these perceptions to negative stereotyping, prejudices, and discrimination, often associated with moral judgments and assumptions that
visibly poor people are to blame for their condition. See, e.g., BLAU, supra note 8; see also Sylvestre
& Bellot, supra note 3. Amy Wax has also examined America’s belief that welfare recipients should
earn, owe something in return, or otherwise be deserving of public aid. See generally Amy L. Wax,
Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of
Welfare Reform, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (2000).
82. Munzer, supra note 25, at 4.
83. Like laws and policies writ large, legal scholarship often reflects tensions in ideological or
normative judgments about the social worthiness of homeless and visibly poor people. Compare
Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows,
and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996), Robert C. Ellickson, The Homelessness Muddle, 99 PUB. INT. 45, 59 (1990) (expressing conservative social and economic policy critiques of
homelessness), and Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV.
295 (1991) (critiquing “liberal” advocacy positions with respect to homelessness) with MARGARET
KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE 167–85 (2004) (critiquing Ellickson’s and Waldron’s theories and advocating for more inclusive public space), and
Stephen Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 387 (critiquing
Ellickson’s theories and observing rifts between typical “conservative” and “liberal” perspectives
on homelessness).
84. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
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those signs then serve as a beacon, signaling to hungry lawbreakers that the
neighborhood does not attend to public order.85 These signals attract new
potential offenders, result in more disorder and crime, and drive away any
remaining law-abiding citizens.86 Due to inadequate social and legal responses to the first broken window, the neighborhood steps onto a greased
slope, facing downhill, sliding into urban decay.87
Even in its earliest iterations, the broken windows theory had special
application to “street people,”88 who are commonly associated with disorderly acts such as being “disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable.”89 In
this way, homeless and visibly poor people themselves actually become “broken windows,” threatening to undermine the order and safety of public space.
Thus, the broken windows theory supports a normative judgment that such
people should be removed from view because “their choice to live on the
streets is disruptive to others.”90 Although the broken windows theory has
been widely discredited as fundamentally flawed,91 anti-democratic,92 and
discriminatory,93 it continues to play a potent and persistent role in criminal
justice and policymaking circles—especially in application to marginalized
groups, including homeless and visibly poor people.94

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 8 (1996).
89. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 85.
90. KELLING & COLES, supra note 88, at 66. Studies belie suggestions that homelessness and
poverty are voluntary conditions. See Lurie & Schuster, supra note 46 (finding that certain marginalized groups are disproportionately impacted by homelessness because of systemic discrimination); Suzanne Skinner, SEATTLE UNIV. HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT, Shut Out: How
Barriers Often Prevent Meaningful Access to Emergency Shelter (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2776421.
91. See GARY BLASI, UCLA SCH. OF LAW, POLICING OUR WAY OUT OF HOMELESSNESS? THE
FIRST YEAR OF THE SAFER CITIES INITIATIVE ON SKID ROW (2007), http://www.ced.berkeley.edu/downloads/pubs/faculty/wolch_2007_report-card-policing-homelessness.pdf; John E. Eck
& Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the
Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, eds., 2000);
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS
POLICING (2001).
92. See, e.g., STEVE HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF
COMMUNITY (2006).
93. The broken windows theory is understood as a major driver of stop-and-frisk policies,
which are roundly criticized as racially discriminatory. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops
and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457,
464 (2000); Daniel Bergner, Is Stop-and-Frisk Worth It?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/04/is-stop-and-frisk-worth-it/358644/.
94. Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3; see also Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Narratives of Punishment: Neoliberalism, Class Interests and the Politics of Social Exclusion, 7 EUR. J. HOMELESSNESS 363, 364 (2013) (agreeing with others that the repression of poor
and homeless people cannot be totally attributed to broken windows policing, but maintaining that
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Thus, complex dynamics—economic, psychological, sociological, and
spatial—feed American perceptions of poor people. Indeed, perceptions of
poverty may be the most salient factor in American determinations of social
worthiness; perceived poverty generally depresses judgments of social
worth.95 This moral calculation may be even more pronounced for homeless
and visibly poor people, even when compared to the generic poor.96 Yet,
before we can understand how this special stigma influences the increasing
exile of visibly poor people from public space, it helps to next investigate
concepts of public space itself.
II. OUR VIEW OF PUBLIC SPACE: A STAGE FOR THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE
Place can be a powerful weapon of social and political control.97
A lightning rod for apportioning rights based on one’s perceived worthiness is the negotiation of public space. Public space fascinates a broad
range of disciplines, including urban studies, sociology, geography, political
science, anthropology, peace studies, architecture, and philosophy.98 The interdisciplinary attraction may be due to the fact that public space has such
crucial physical, social, legal, and political meaning. This Section briefly
surveys interdisciplinary perspectives on human contests to control and define it.
In a purely physical sense, public space refers to any combination of a
built and natural environment that is accessible to the public as a whole for
collective or personal activities.99 But public space may be more accurately
defined as “all areas that are open and accessible to all members of the public

broken windows theories have “been widely and conveniently used as legitimating discourses to
justify existing repressive practices” in the United States and elsewhere).
95. For example, neurological studies suggest that people show higher degrees of support or
tolerance for certain racial minorities when those individuals are associated with indicia of higher
socioeconomic status. See FISKE, supra note 12.
96. Many sociological theories suggest that stigma and inequality-legitimating ideologies result in higher degrees of stigma for homeless people versus poor people generally. See, e.g., Phelan
et al., supra note 46 (reviewing such theories and related studies).
97. Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 581 (2006).
98. See generally Judit Bodnar, Reclaiming Public Space, 52 URB. STUD. 2090 (2015) (reviewing decades of cross-disciplinary obsessions with the topic of public space); see also Zachary
Neal, Seeking Common Ground: Three Perspectives on Public Space, 163 URB. DESIGN & PLAN.
59 (2010) (reviewing various disciplinary perspectives on public space).
99. See MATTHEW CARMONA ET AL., PUBLIC PLACES-URBAN SPACES: THE DIMENSIONS OF
URBAN DESIGN 111 (2003); STEPHEN CARR ET AL., PUBLIC SPACE (1992); see also Public,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining public as “[o]pen or available for all to use,
share, or enjoy”).
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in a society, in principle though not necessarily in practice.”100 This addendum—“in principle though not necessarily in practice”—is key. In theory,
truly public space should be equally accessible to everyone, but in reality it
is not. Determining who controls and defines access to public space is a
complicated playground for the influence of exile. In constructions of public
space, who is a member of the public? Who decides the terms of this membership and correlated access to public space?
A. Socio-Political Constructions of Public Space
Socio-political constructions of public space often center on diversity,
difference, and democratic function. Public space, according to some commentators, is a bastion of democratization.101 The fundamental purpose of
public space in a democratic society goes beyond being a shared forum
equally accessible to all people; sharing public space actually challenges our
instincts to create social segregation by physically integrating us with diverse
strangers.102 Public space is a unique forum for self-expression and the creation of identity, which requires interaction with others—especially
strangers.103 Thus, sharing public space tests our tolerance for diversity, including our exposure to and engagement with “otherness.” But it also presents opportunities to advance our social growth, our understanding of ourselves, and the world around us. Indeed, “democracy requires physical space
for its performance.”104
Moreover, the difference and diversity values of public space are unique
and irreplaceable: “Public streets and sidewalks are the only remaining sites
of public expression and ‘unscripted political activity,’ and their main function is making poverty and inequality visible.”105 Many critics reject a monolithic, normative construction “of the public sphere, suggesting that it should

100. COMMON GROUND? READINGS AND REFLECTIONS ON PUBLIC SPACE 1 (Anthony Orum
& Zachary Neal eds., 2010). For more on the definitional complexity of the public/private distinction, see Jeff Weintraub, The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A GRAND DICHOTOMY 7 (Alan Wolfe
ed., 1997).
101. See, e.g., JOHN R. PARKINSON, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC SPACE: THE PHYSICAL SITES OF
DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE 24 (2012).
102. Some scholars frame a democratic ideal of public space as “the commons.” See DAVID
BOLLIER, SILENT THEFT: THE PRIVATE PLUNDER OF OUR COMMON WEALTH 2–3 (2003) (describing public, or common, space as the “valuable resources that the American people collectively
own”). Similarly, Professor Lawrence Lessig describes the commons as a resource for “joint use or
possession; to be held or enjoyed equally by a number of persons.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 19 (2002) (quoting Commons, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY); PARKINSON, supra note 101.
103. As one scholar observes: “It is easy to forget that public space thrives on diversity and the
lack thereof can kill it.” Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2095.
104. PARKINSON, supra note 101, at 4.
105. Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2097 (quoting KOHN, supra note 83).
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include . . . a variety of subaltern or counter-publics.”106 Even frictions with
others is of significant value; “in the presence of difference people have at
least the possibility to step outside themselves,” creating opportunities for
personal growth.107 The price of this opportunity is engagement with
strangers and their associated differences, which can produce feelings of anxiety or fear.108
Proximity to different people, views, and behaviors may also be the key
to overcoming fear and to forming new socio-spatial connections. In social
science, for example, the contact hypothesis suggests that exposure of empowered in-groups to highly-stigmatized out-groups can favorably change
the attitudes and perspectives of in-groups with respect to out-groups.109
City centers, exemplars of public space, hold the promise to engage us
in the reality of “living among strangers, [creating] the very basis of public
space where civility towards diversity and difference rules.”110 In this sense,
public space teaches us the value of tolerance, cultivating “the constant and
intense proximity of difference” that “makes civility a pressing moral and
sociological requirement.”111 Engaging diverse strangers “presupposes an
active and affirmative moral relationship between persons” and the moral
equality it suggests is instrumental in the rise of a democratic public
sphere.112 Such socio-political constructions of public space suggest an ideal
of city centers as a crucial venue for interaction, difference, and exercising
tolerance.
But such ideals conflict with America’s commitment to disorder-suppression or broken windows-type policies. Robert Ellickson starkly animates
the spatialization of social order in his influential article, Controlling Chronic
Misconduct in City Spaces.113 He argues that certain behaviors associated
with visibly poor people, such as begging, violate community norms of civility and appropriateness. Accordingly, cities should confine certain non-conforming people to specific zones where undesirable people can be more effectively policed.114 Ellickson proposes a color-coded zoning system to
allocate downtown space, a system “modeled on traffic lights with red signaling caution to the ordinary pedestrian, yellow, some caution, and green, a
106. Neal, supra note 98, at 63 (citing to and discussing many of these theories).
107. Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2093.
108. Id. at 2092 (describing how interactions with strangers or other evidence of difference can
be “unpleasant and sometime even frightening . . . . Unknown and unassimilated otherness can produce cognitive and emotional shocks”).
109. See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 34, at 40 (concluding that “multiple types of ingroup exposure” to homeless people can have a positive influence on in-groups’ opinions and beliefs about
people experiencing homelessness).
110. Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2091.
111. Richard Boyd, ‘The Value of Civility?’, 43 URB. STUD. 863, 871 (2006).
112. Id. at 875.
113. See Ellickson, supra note 83.
114. Id. at 1208–09.

FinalAuthorReview

2016]

10/31/2016 12:22 PM

THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE

27

promise of safety.”115 Red zones would allow noise, public drunkenness,
prostitution, and other forms of “disorderly conduct.”116 Yellow zones would
prohibit “offensive” activities such as panhandling and other “public nuisances,” but some “flamboyant and eccentric conduct” would be permitted.117
Green zones would serve as a refuge for the “unusually sensitive” members
of society, such as children and elderly people.118 Strict social controls in
green zone sanctuaries would prohibit any potentially “disruptive” activities
which are currently legal, such as dog walking or playing a radio.119 According to Ellickson’s logic, segregating people based on their compliance with
community norms would ensure that downtown space is most efficiently enjoyed.
Such “zoning by behavior” proposals have been both embraced120 and
vigorously critiqued as discriminatory or Orwellian,121 and yet, as further explained below, they are also fairly characterized as the “prevailing logic” behind contemporary regulations of public space.122 Clear tensions exist between the ideals of creating and maintaining inclusive and diverse public
space that encourages difference and discomfort when compared to ideals
that segregate people based on their perceived compliance with in-group
norms. Marginalized groups—by the very nature of their marginalization—
have little power in the negotiation of this tension or its manifestation in the
American conscience, laws, and policies.
B. Legal Constructions of Public Space
The law has long been fascinated with the regulation of public space.
Part of this fascination concerns the thorny exercise of distinguishing between public and private property and the constitutional rights or obligations
attendant to a property’s categorization. In the property context, governmentowned property is frequently construed as “public” property in contrast to
“everything else.”123 But, “in the modern world of quasi-public entities and
governmental privatization, attempts to categorize entities, properties, and
115. KOHN, supra note 83, at 168 (discussing Ellickson, supra note 83, at 1120).
116. Ellickson, supra note 83, at 1221.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1221–22.
119. Id. at 1222.
120. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 57, 70–73 (2011) (discussing Ellickson’s zoning proposal and describing the presence of “transient homeless populations[s]” in public space as undesirable and requiring heightened governmental or private management to “enforce social norms”).
121. Munzer, supra note 25, at 40.
122. KOHN, supra note 83; see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2004) (describing the persistence of broken windows theory in public zoning
regulations).
123. See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
29 (2002).
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activities as strictly public or private have led to frustration and uncertainty.”124
Legal narratives commonly center on the right to exclude. Legal scholarship frequently reflects on the “tragedy of the commons,” an economicallyoriented belief that public space ultimately degrades when governmental or
private managers fail to exclude potential users who lack incentives to conserve or sustain the space as a shared resource.125 As further explained below,
some narratives challenge the law’s obsession with exclusion, arguing for a
construct more consistent with inclusion and diversity. But these critiques
are themselves outliers because, in most respects, they do not represent the
current state of the law.
1. Exile in Property Law
Property law is a fundamental node in American hierarchical constructions of space. Indeed, the right to exclude others is “one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”126
Through exclusion, property expresses its meaning in terms of the acquisition, access, occupation, use, and ownership of resources, including physical
space.
a. Property Zoning and Regulations
Broken windows policies—which, as previously discussed, suppress
evidence of normatively defined disorder and feed the stigmatization of visibly poor people—not only permeate the American approaches to criminal
justice and community policing, but they also influence American property
regulations. Nicole Garnett investigates the relationship between “ordermaintenance efforts” and property regulation in her article, Ordering (and
Order in) the City.127 She acknowledges that “disorder suppression” is the

124. Paul M. Schoenhard, A Three-Dimensional Approach to the Public-Private Distinction,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (2008). Shoenhard surveys other commentary on the “decline of the
public-private distinction,” including Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s regret over the majority decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (opining
that the majority reasoning served to “wash out any distinction between private and public use of
property”).
125. The “tragedy of the commons” was coined by Garrett Hardin in The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). Illustrative commentary includes Carol Rose, The Comedy of
the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986)
(reviewing the history of legal doctrine concerning public access to private property), and Foster,
supra note 120, at 57 (contending that the tragedy of the commons occurs “during periods of ‘regulatory slippage’—when the level of local government oversight . . . significantly declines”).
126. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Thomas W. Merrill,
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (arguing “the right to exclude
others” is more than just “one of the most essential constituents of property—it is its sine qua non”).
127. Garnett, supra note 122, at 3.
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“first function of property regulation.”128 Efforts such as the authorization of
private property inspections129 and public nuisance lawsuits130 codify the priority of suppressing disorder. Indeed, Garnett goes further, suggesting that
“our dominant form of property regulation—Euclidean zoning—has addressed the spatial separation of different land uses rather than property conditions. That is, the point of ubiquitous zoning laws is to put ‘everything in
its place,’ to segregate economic from noneconomic activities, rich from
poor, etc.”131
Garnett challenges the codification of disorder-suppression ideologies,
which erroneously “equate ordered land uses with the absence of disorder.”132
She shows that collectively, such pervasive property regulations devastate
“the social and economic prospects of poor people.”133 Such over-regulation
or “misregulation” of property actually “impede[s] efforts to restore a vibrant, healthy, and organic public order.”134 Having laid bare some of the
potentially negative impacts of property regulations on marginalized communities, Garnett stops short of examining why property law might operate
this way. Instead, she endeavors to reconcile her critique of property regulation rules with “the social norms justifications for the order-maintenance
agenda.”135 Accordingly, her recommendations fall in line with the economic
compass that predictably guides so much of property law.136 This approach,
like that of the law generally, leaves the influence of exile undisturbed.
b. Progressive Property Critiques
A collection of “progressive property” scholars have perhaps come closest to exposing the influence of exile on property law. These scholars critique
American law and policy as not only generally obsessed with exclusion, but
as specifically bent on the exclusion of marginalized groups.137 Professor

128. Id. at 7.
129. Id. at 13–19.
130. Id. at 20–21.
131. Id. at 21.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 26.
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id. at 42.
136. For example, Garnett suggests that single-use zoning laws, such as those that prohibit inhome childcare or other entrepreneurial efforts, should be revisited because they stifle “community
renewal.” Id. at 57–58. Compare Garnett’s critique with Marc Roark’s critique in Homelessness at
the Cathedral, 80 MO. L. REV. 53 (2015) (critiquing norm-driven frameworks of property law on
the basis that the “dominant” community identity influences the regulation of public and private
space to the exclusion of people experiencing homelessness).
137. Indeed, Professor Rosser describes progressive property theory as the contemporary “site
of intervention to challenge the extent to which property rights trump the interests of the propertyless.” Rosser, supra note 28, at 114.
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Ezra Rosser describes this developing field as comprised of two linked propositions: “(1) that conventional law and economics and the related assumption of a single metric—efficiency—should not be the sole means of evaluating laws and establishing property norms, and (2) that alternative,
progressive frameworks should be used.”138 Rosser further explains that progressive property scholars represent “both a reaction against the particularly
strong influence of economic approaches to the law and an assertion that
property lawmaking must be more nuanced, more expressly political, and less
preoccupied with the owner’s right to exclude.”139
Progressive property theorists argue that American property law should
be reconstructed to reflect owners’ social140 and moral141 obligations, including the call to better support civility142 and democratic principles.143 Property
expresses and reproduces power,144 so progressive property theorists argue
that the law “should promote the ability of each person to obtain the material
resources necessary for full social and political participation.”145
By pushing such radical reconstructions of the law and legal discourse,
progressive property norms challenge deep American conceptions of property. Still, some think progressive property theories are not radical enough.
For example, Rosser claims that progressive property theories still fail to adequately emphasize “the troubling origins of ownership in the United
States,”146 which limits progressive property scholars’ analysis and advocacy, especially around the redistribution of property rights to atone for “prior
wrongful acquisition” and to correct “related, currently experienced inequality.”147 Rosser offers examples of “the racialized nature of acquisition and
distribution”148 in American history, including the forced dispossession of

138. Id. at 110.
139. Id.
140. See id. (discussing Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009)).
141. Peñalver, supra note 26.
142. Professor Alexander calls this “human flourishing.” Gregory S. Alexander, The SocialObligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 770 (2009).
143. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1047 (2009). For Professor Singer, property law should reflect
democratic principles, such as our social obligations to one another and the need to “treat[] each
person with equal concern and respect.” Id. at 1037.
144. Rosser, supra note 28, at 126; see also Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status,
107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 757 (2009) (noting “perhaps the most ubiquitous and important messages
that property communicates have to do with relative status, with the material world defining and
reinforcing a variety of economic, social, and cultural hierarchies”).
145. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
743, 744 (2009).
146. Rosser, supra note 28, at 127.
147. Id. at 111.
148. Id.
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Native American lands and “the systematic exploitation of African Americans, first as slaves and later as second-class citizens.”149 According to
Rosser, American property law not only fails to appreciate this tainted history, but also perpetuates such oppression and exploitation through doctrines
and practices of inheritance.150
Despite progressive property theorists’ common focus on private property, these critiques translate to laws and policies concerning public space.
Integrating Rosser’s critique, progressive property scholars not only challenge property law’s codifications of the instinct to exclude, but they also
suggest how dominant groups may express unconscious biases and discrimination against marginalized groups through the rules of property. Indeed,
many of these scholars’ concerns about the role of discrimination in the context of private property arguably become more pointed and urgent when they
are extended to public space.
2. Exile Under the First Amendment
First Amendment jurisprudence ostensibly implicates values of diversity and difference in public space; however, as explained herein, it also fails
to adequately address the influence of exile.151 At first blush, things seem
promising for marginalized groups. Governmental decisions about how to
regulate public space are generally presumed to be constitutional,152 but when
First Amendment rights are implicated, the burden shifts to the state to justify
any restriction on speech.153 In reviewing a free speech challenge to a governmental regulation of public space, courts will modify the level of judicial
scrutiny depending on just how “public” the property is deemed to be.154 This

149. Id. at 128–33 (examining the role of colonialism and the dispossession of Indian land); id.
at 133–40 (examining the role of slavery and racism).
150. Id. at 128 (“Society . . . treats property acquisition as a given, disconnected from past
wrongs, even as new generations inherit the benefits and harms of property’s racial legacy.”).
151. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). The First Amendment provides,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. Generally, First Amendment rights only extend to the expression of speech on public but not private
property. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972). Of course, the constitutionality
of governmental regulation of public spaces is challenged under many other theories than free
speech. See infra Part III.C (surveying various legal challenges to criminalization laws).
152. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973); United States v. Bollinger, 966 F. Supp. 2d 568, 571 (W.D.N.C. 2013); see James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 156 (1893).
153. E.g. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999);
Italian Colors Rest. v. Harris, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1209 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
154. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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inquiry—commonly referred to as public forum analysis—turns on the value
of the public space as a site of expression and communication of ideas.155
Quintessential public fora include places like streets, sidewalks, and
parks, which “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and . . . have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”156 Indeed, the First
Amendment protects the expression of offensive and disagreeable speech in
public fora on the grounds that it is essential to American democracy.157 Accordingly, a governmental regulation of speech in a public forum is subject
to stricter scrutiny158 if it is content-based,159 rather than if it is content-neutral
with respect to time, place, or manner. This restriction is warranted because
the former “raises a very serious concern that the government is using its
power to tilt public debate in a direction of its choosing.”160 In this sense,
First Amendment concerns appear consistent with socio-political values of
diversity and difference in public space, even when the protection of those
values might result in confrontation, tension, and discomfort.161 Such protection is particularly vital to the rights of marginalized groups, political outsiders whose views and interests fall outside of, or conflict with, the priorities
of governing in-groups.162 Accordingly, marginalized groups frequently rely
155. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992). Critiques of the public forum doctrine abound. See, e.g., Zick, supra note 97, at 586 n.26 & 27 (citing
several such critiques).
156. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague, 307 U.S. at 515).
157. “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). “[F]reedom to differ is not limited to
things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance
is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.” West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
158. Content-based restrictions “must satisfy strict scrutiny—that is, [they] must be the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.” McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518,
2530 (2014); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (requiring “the Government to prove that [a content-based] restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest” (quoting Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 (2011)).
159. Reed also distinguished between “viewpoint discrimination” and “content discrimination.”
Viewpoint discrimination regulates speech based on “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)). By contrast, content discrimination prohibits a broad topic from discussion. Id. A law “targeted at specific subject matter is content
based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.” Id.
160. Cutting v. City of Portland, 802 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 2015).
161. For First Amendment purposes, a person walking down a street or sidewalk might be “confronted with an uncomfortable message” that they cannot avoid; this “is a virtue, not a vice.” McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2529.
162. See supra Part I about systemic discrimination and power hierarchies. See also Zick, supra
note 97, at 584–85 (“Social and political movements often require disruption and a degree of confrontation with authority in order to be even marginally effective.”). Zick contends that the problem
is particularly acute in America, noting that First Amendment jurisprudence routinely allows for the
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on public space as a venue to effectively communicate their needs to wide
audiences.163
But the First Amendment may not adequately protect marginalized
groups who represent dissention from social norms or who offend common
sensibilities—the very sort of speech the First Amendment is supposed to
protect.164 Courts often construe speech restrictions as content-neutral165; accordingly, courts often defer to governmental proffers that such restrictions
are necessary to maintain order or security.166 Through a functionally “weak
strain of rationality review,”167 city and state governments “have learned to
manipulate geography in a manner that now seriously threatens basic First
Amendment principles.”168 In other words, spatial regulations are evolving
and adapting in order to effectively mitigate speech critical of the status quo,
yet still avoid potential constitutional liability.
Although, visibly poor people engage in various forms of protest that
cities increasingly prohibit or restrict despite the First Amendment.169 Consider a threshold example: visibly poor people who speak in public by asking
for help. City-wide bans against begging are on the rise,170 despite the fact
that begging is a well-established form of constitutionally protected

“neutering [of] political dissent, [while] protesters in countries deemed far less friendly to dissent
are discovering the power that comes with the ability to access, even commandeer, public spaces.”
Id. at 587.
163. See Michael Lipsky, Protest as a Political Resource, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1144, 1144
(1968) (suggesting that public protest “represents an important aspect of minority group and low
income group politics”); see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNNY OF THE MAJORITY:
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 135 (1994) (charting the relationship
between American territorial districting and the disempowerment of politically powerless groups).
164. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (describing the purpose of First
Amendment protections). As discussed in Part III, infra, visibly poor people engage in various
forms of protest by virtue of their very existence in public space.
165. Zick, supra note 97, at 583.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 584, 589–90 (“Political dissent has become spatial tactics’ principal casualty.”).
169. See id. For example, anti-camping bans have been challenged under the First Amendment.
Tents and other temporary structures have been found to be viable instruments of political speech.
See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); ACORN v. City of Tulsa,
835 F.2d 735, 742 (10th Cir. 1987); Occupy Minneapolis v. Cty. of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d
1062, 1069, 1071 (D. Minn. 2011) (sleeping and overnight occupation of tents in a park was expressive conduct protected by First Amendment, although it could be regulated by a permit scheme
that functions as a valid time, place, or manner restriction); Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort
Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (same); Students Against Apartheid Coal. v.
O’Neill, 660 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Va. 1987); Univ. of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Peterson,
649 F. Supp. 1200, 1204–05 (D. Utah 1986). Other potential First Amendment applications to
visibly poor people, such as the right to assemble and protest, are further discussed infra, Part III.
170. NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15.
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speech.171 Although the judiciary offers some protection from violations of
this First Amendment right, it has not been a consistently reliable refuge.172
Moreover, cities often attempt to avoid heightened judicial scrutiny by
drafting their anti-begging laws “broadly, under the counterintuitive rationale
that they can mitigate First Amendment problems . . . by restricting more
speech.”173 For example, Everett, Washington’s city council recently
amended its “aggressive” panhandling law to be more expansive than the
prior version, which had specifically provided that the defendant cause or
attempt to cause “another person reasonably to fear imminent bodily harm or
the commission of a criminal act upon their person, or upon property in their
immediate possession.”174 But in January of 2015, Everett’s city council inserted the word “charities” to suggest the aggressive panhandling law might
apply to charitable organizations as well as individuals,175 a move fairly criticized as pretext.176 Indeed, Everett went further, removing any concrete examples of when or how a defendant’s conduct might trigger reasonable fear,
requiring simply that the defendant undertake “conduct that would make a
reasonable person fearful or feel compelled.”177 As explained earlier in this
Article, social science and popular sentiment suggest that people increasingly
find it reasonable to be fearful or feel compelled when confronted with visible
poverty—even in the form of peaceable panhandling.178 Accordingly, such
a broad intent-to-intimidate standard is circular and problematic: panhandlers
intend to ask people for money, and merely doing so often makes people feel

171. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); Julia Koestner, Begging the (First Amendment) Question: The Constitutionality of Arizona’s Prohibition of
Begging in a Public Place, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1227, 1243 (2013); Charles Mitchell, Aggressive Panhandling Legislation and Free Speech Claims: Begging for Trouble, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 697,
698 (1994).
172. See Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the
Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896 (1991); Nancy A. Millich, Compassion Fatigue and the First
Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional Castaways?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 266 (1994);
see also NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15.
173. Joseph Mead, The First Amendment Protection of Charitable Speech, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
FURTHERMORE 57, 59 (2015).
174. EVERETT, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 9.52, § 010 (1987) (amended 2015), https://everettwa.gov/AgendaCenter/ViewFile/Item/3260?fileID=18048; Letter from Jennifer Shaw, Nancy
Talner & Jon Cooper, American Civil Liberties Union, to Ray Stephanson, Mayor, City of Everett
(Oct. 27, 2015), https://aclu-wa.org/docs/aclu-says-everett-s-panhandling-law-punishes-freespeech-poor-people.
175. EVERETT, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 9.52, § 010 (2015).
176. Letter from the Homeless Rights Advocacy Project et al. to Ray Stephanson, Mayor, City
of Everett (Oct. 27, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter]; Mead, supra note 173, at 60
(noting that “the very use of the word ‘panhandling’ lays bare the legislative purpose”).
177. EVERETT, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 9.52, § 010 (2015).
178. See supra Part I.B–D. See also Letter, supra note 176, at 3 (“Moreover, people often respond because they feel compelled—and compelled for many reasons, including sympathy—but
feeling compulsion without threated or actual aggression is not a threat to public safety.”)
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compelled or fearful. Thus, such anti-begging laws fail to distinguish between truly dangerous or aggressive behavior and merely perceived danger,
a common consequence of witnessing someone who appears to be in desperate circumstances. Accordingly, increasingly popular laws like Everett’s
functionally conflate even peaceable begging—constitutionally protected
speech—with criminality.179
Cities commonly invoke phrases like “public safety” to insulate themselves from First Amendment challenges, and courts frequently defer to such
rationales.180 Of course, public safety is a compelling interest because it is
“the heart of the government’s function”181; however, the definition of “public safety” must also be understood in the context of the instinct to construct
poor people as blameworthy or criminal.182 The potential for unconscious
bias, especially in the context of judicial discretion,183 means that courts may
accept governmental rationalizations for reducing visible evidence of poverty—such as homeless encampments or panhandling. These rationalizations
include public safety (because visible poverty is perceived as dangerous) or
the stimulation of tourism (because visible poverty is inconsistent with consumerism).184 In other words, courts have upheld laws that effectively push
visibly poor people out of public space merely because visible evidence of
human desperation tends to undermine feelings of safety or the desire to
shop.185

179. NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 20 (noting seventy-six percent of surveyed cities prohibit begging in particular public places and a twenty-five percent overall increase of city-wide bans
on begging in public). Cities are not only broadening their anti-begging laws; they often share
model ordinance language with each other, allowing such restrictive laws to proliferate nationwide.
See, e.g., Mead, supra note 173, at 59 n.3; Nick Licata, Inside the Conservative Plan to Take Over
City Politics, CROSSCUT (Jan. 6, 2016), http://crosscut.com/2016/01/a-seattle-liberal-ventures-intoa-den-of-conservative-activism/.
180. See, e.g., Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014) (accepting city’s justification of public safety as basis for holding the anti-begging law was content-neutral), vacated, 135
S. Ct. 2887 (2015); Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g,
806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive
Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439, 440 (2006) (critiquing First Amendment jurisprudence
and arguing that “[c]ourts routinely conclude that the government’s (unsubstantiated) interests outweigh the rights of speakers”).
181. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. City of League City, 488 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2007).
182. See supra Part I (discussing views of poor people as blameworthy or criminal).
183. The judiciary is not immune to unconscious bias. See, e.g., Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 154 (2013); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit
Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012).
184. NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 12 (surveying these laws and noting they are “designed
to move visibly homeless people out of commercial and tourist districts or, increasingly, out of
entire cities, [and] are often justified as necessary public health and public safety measures”).
185. BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 40, at 21 (“[M]any simply do not wish to see those who
appear disorderly or otherwise inspire trepidation. Nor is it pleasant to be reminded of the deprivations associated with homelessness, severe poverty, addiction, or mental illness.”).
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Things may be looking up for visibly poor people who ask for charity
in public.186 For some time, circuits have been split about whether such broad
restrictions on charitable speech, including begging, are content-based restrictions subject to strict scrutiny.187 However, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,188
the United States Supreme Court clarified the definition of a content-based
restriction in a way that should encourage courts to determine that anti-begging laws are content-based restrictions subject to strict scrutiny.189 Thus, in
the wake of Reed, courts should no longer defer to the government’s “benign
motive[s],”190 such as the invocation of public health or safety. Instead,
courts should more aggressively scrutinize such rationales for evidence of
pretext for discrimination against visibly poor people.191
The increasing prevalence of anti-begging laws is a helpful example of
how unconscious biases against poor people and deep-rooted associations between visible poverty and danger can become manifest in the law. Post-Reed,
we shall see if First Amendment jurisprudence—with its expressed interest
in protecting diversity and difference—adequately addresses one indicium of
the influence of exile, at least in the limited context of anti-begging laws.192
But even if the judiciary were to adequately protect certain First Amendment rights of visibly poor people, city governments appear unrelenting in
their efforts to abridge such rights.193 As these laws multiply at a viral rate,
access to justice issues—which are particularly pronounced for homeless and
visibly poor people—compound the problem.194 Without adequate means to
challenge these popular restrictions in court, visibly poor people are likely to
remain First Amendment “constitutional castaways.”195

186. NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 21 (noting that “[i]n the absence of employment opportunities or when homeless people are unable to access needed public benefits, panhandling may
be a person’s only option for obtaining money”).
187. See Mead, supra note 173, at 57–59.
188. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
189. Id. at 2227, 2230; see Mead, supra note 173, at 61 (discussing and quoting Reed).
190. See Mead, supra note 173, at 61.
191. Courts most clearly scrutinize for pretext in the context of Title VII employment discrimination cases. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995). But
at least the Seventh Circuit has already responded to Reed, applying strict scrutiny and reversing an
anti-begging law previously upheld as constitutional. Norton, 768 F.3d at 717.
192. For a sanguine perspective on Reed’s potential impact on begging restrictions, see Anthony
Lauriello, Note, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 1105
(2016).
193. See NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15.
194. See supra note 24.
195. Millich, supra note 172.

FinalAuthorReview

2016]

10/31/2016 12:22 PM

THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE

37

C. The “Death of Public Space”
Political and legal theories aside, public space—and its appetite for diversity, difference, and social growth—is a quickly shrinking resource.196
Economic theories commonly frame public space as a type of public good,
“a resource that individuals cannot be prevented from consuming (i.e. nonexcludable) and for which one individual’s consumption does not diminish
its potential consumption by others (i.e. non-rivalrous).”197 But when the resource of public space becomes overcrowded or in high demand, it becomes
less “public” and more “privatized”:
To manage the congestion, an organisation charged with maintaining the space introduces regulations to restrict its use, thereby reducing consumption rivalries but also making the space more exclusive. As these regulations are incrementally expanded,
assigning control over specific parts to certain individuals or
groups, the public space takes on the character of a partly or completely private space.198
Thus, public space can also be understood in contrast to privatized
space, which is distinguished by more exclusive degrees of access. In this
context, access refers not only to physical access or entry into the space, but
also to social accessibility—the accessibility of activities, information, and
resources in the space.199
Government actors are not the only, or even the most influential, regulators of public space. Over the last century, the financing of public space
has shifted from state and public expenditures to private developers.200 Business improvement districts and other “public-private partnerships” continue
to assume increasingly important roles in the financing and governance of
public space.201 As a result, public space is increasingly privatized.202
By the 1990s, the increasing privatization of public space prompted
teams of interdisciplinary scholars to sound alarms predicting the “death of
public space.” Such critics contended that the traditional purpose of public
space as a center for social and political diversity was giving way to more

196. See generally KOHN, supra note 83; Alex Glyman, SEATTLE UNIV. HOMELESS RIGHTS
ADVOCACY PROJECT, Blurred Lines: Homelessness and The Increasing Privatization of Public
Space (Sara K. Rankin ed., 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2776876.
197. See Neal, supra note 98, at 60 (citing Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387 (1954)).
198. Neal, supra note 98, at 60.
199. See PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE (Stanley Benn & Gerald Gaus eds., 1983); see
also KOHN, supra note 83, at 1–14.
200. Neal, supra note 98, at 61, 63 (citing studies and noting the influence of zoning laws on
the privatization of public space).
201. Id. at 60; Glyman, supra note 196, at i.
202. See generally Glyman, supra note 196; KOHN, supra note 83.
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contemporary promotions of consumerism.203 This focus on consumerism
seeks to purge indicia of diversity from urban centers, in favor of a new, sanitized, and commercialized space that caters to middle and upper-classes.204
The economic concept of competing for slices of the “fixed pie” of public
space is particularly acute in the context of gentrification, which is “an essentially economic process of increasing land values but with wide-ranging
social consequences.”205
Contemporary conceptions of public space focus on leisure and fostering fraternity with like-minded individuals, but such expectations trend toward homogeneity and the exclusion of indicia of difference in order to create
a relaxed, social atmosphere.206 Public space then serves as a vehicle for
socioeconomic and class conformity,207 referring to expectations about and
enforcement of identities, actions, and appearances that are “normal” and acceptable.208 In this sense, public space should uphold a mirror of sameness,
or at least, similarity. Deeming public space as a normative space not only
contradicts the traditional hallmarks of “diversity and grittiness that the public entails,” but also inevitably moves toward the expulsion of such diversity
and grittiness—visibly poor people and associated evidence of human suffering—as sources of tension that contradict the desired public stage of sociability, consumerism, and relaxed entertainment.209
Today’s sprawling shopping malls exemplify the hybridization of private and public space. The U.S. Supreme Court confronted the issue in
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins,210 where the Court found that a shop-

203. Many urban studies scholars refer to this process of the privatization of public space as
“festivalization.” See, e.g., Andrew Smith, ‘Borrowing’ Public Space to Stage Major Events: The
Greenwich Park Controversy, 51 URB. STUD. 247, 247 (2014); Sally Weller, Consuming the City:
Public Fashion Festivals and the Participatory Economies of Urban Spaces in Melbourne, Australia, 50 URB. STUD. 2853 (2013). One particularly well-known critique of the privatization of
public space is from Michael Sorkin’s edited collection, Introduction: Variations on a Theme Park,
in VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE xi
(Sorkin ed., 1992) (concluding that urban centers were converting to theme parks).
204. BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 40, at 21. “[M]any simply do not wish to see those who
appear disorderly or who otherwise inspire trepidation. Nor is it pleasant to be reminded of the
deprivations associated with homelessness, severe poverty, addiction, or mental illness.” Id.
205. Neal, supra note 98, at 63; see also KOHN, supra note 83, at 8 (noting “[t]he privatization
of public space exacerbates the effects of racial and class segregation that already exists in housing
patterns”).
206. See Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2097 (“The dialectics of community building is such that
accepting members comes at the cost of excluding others.”).
207. Sylvestre, supra note 94, at 365 (noting “marginality corresponds, both historically and in
the present, to certain empowered groups’ interests related to the preservation of a certain social and
economic order”).
208. Gabrielle Pollini, Elements of a Theory of Place Attachment and Socio-Territorial Belonging, 15 INT’L REV. SOC. 497–502 (2005).
209. Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2097.
210. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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ping mall, unlike a conventional private space, issues an invitation to the general public and, therefore, opens itself up to certain regulations. Many subsequent decisions seized on this notion of shopping malls as the new, quintessential quasi-public space, reasoning that the traditional town centers—
historically public sites for socializing and democratization—no longer exist
in most contemporary areas. Accordingly, the shopping mall was emerging
as the new, contemporary heart of public space.211
But, shopping malls are not ideals of public space: they remain fundamentally private spaces with commercial interests, corporate governance, and
private security guards.212 Private businesses exist for one primary purpose:
to spur and feed consumerism. A key component of this process is to offer a
controlled, sanitized, comfortable space that purges “troubled urbanity of its
sting, of the presence of the poor, of crime, of dirt, of work.”213
The macrocosm of the shopping mall is the downtown area. Thus, a
popular belief among private businesses, particularly coordinated businesses
such as downtown business improvement districts (“BIDs”), is that in order
to maximize profits, they must remove any physical evidence that undercuts
the desire to spend money. BIDs demonstrate the blurring of government
and private action: First, BIDs heavily influence the lawmaking process, including the enactment of laws regulating public space.214 Second, BIDs often
assume quasi-governmental roles, such as “deputizing private citizens to police downtown areas.”215 When private business interests reign over the governance of public space, visibly poor people are often negatively impacted.216
The increasing visibility of poor and homeless people in urban centers provokes significant backlash, especially from businesses.217 City officials and

211. See Mark C. Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shopping Mall, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999).
212. Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2097.
213. Sorkin, supra note 203, at xv.
214. Glyman, supra note 196 at i; Memorandum from the Berkeley Policy Advocacy Clinic on
BIDs Enabling Legislation to Paul Boden, Western Regional Advocacy Project (Oct. 29, 2015) (on
file with the author) [hereinafter Berkeley Policy Advocacy Clinic]. Some may agree that the
“death” or privatization of public space coincides with the “death” or privatization of democracy.
Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page drew data from over 1,800 different policy initiatives from 1981
to 2002 and concluded that rich, well-connected individuals steer American politics, regardless of
or even contrary to the will of the majority of voters. See Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing
Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL.
564 (2014) (noting that “economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have
substantial, independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest groups and
average citizens have little or no independent influence”).
215. Glyman, supra note 196, at i.
216. Id.; Berkeley Policy Advocacy Clinic, supra note 214.
217. DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC
SPACE (2003); see also Schweik, supra note 72, at 5 (noting “[m]ost of the current spatial policies
and practices that do the work of old unsightly beggar ordinances route primarily through the mechanisms of rampant privatization and private control of ‘securescapes’ in the city” (citing BECKETT
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businesses face pressure to create cosmetically attractive downtown areas
that will attract shoppers and tourists.218 Indeed, surveys consistently show
that visibly poor people report more frequent harassment from private security or BID ambassador-type authority figures than from police officers.219
Thus, the increasing privatization of public space frustrates socio-political ideals of democracy and difference.220 It reinforces the power to exclude
and control marginalized groups as fundamental to property laws and policies.221 As further explained below, over the past twenty years, the combination of economic conditions, broken window ideologies, and the human
drive to exile created a perfect storm for the increasing enactment of laws
that purge signs of visible poverty from public space.222
III. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF VISIBLY POOR PEOPLE: WHERE PUBLIC
SPACE AND THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE COLLIDE
The wealthy working people have earned their right to live in the
city. They went out, got an education, work hard, and earned
it . . . . I shouldn’t have to see the pain, struggle, and despair of
homeless people to and from my way to work every day.223
Is being visibly poor a crime? Should it be? Consider, for a moment,
how you would live your life—perform the daily activities you must every
day, such as sleeping, eating, drinking, sitting, resting, or even going to the
bathroom—if you were forced to live each moment in public. Without resort
to shelter, could you perform any of these necessary, life-sustaining activities

& HERBERT, supra note 40 (discussing privatization)); Lawrence Vale, Securing Public Space
[Awards Jury Commentaries], 17 PLACES 33 (2005) (discussing securescapes)).
218. MITCHELL, supra note 217.
219. CHRIS HERRING, TONY SPARKS & DILARA YARBOUGH, COAL. ON HOMLESSNESS,
PUNISHING THE POOREST: HOW THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS PERPETUATES
POVERTY IN SAN FRANCISCO (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2620426; NAT’L COAL. FOR THE
HOMELESS, DISCRIMINATION AND ECONOMIC PROFILING AMONG THE HOMELESS OF
WASHINGTON, DC (Apr. 2014), http://nationalhomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/DiscriminationReport20141.pdf; TONY ROBINSON & ALLISON SICKELS, NO RIGHT TO REST:
CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS IN COLORADO (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.cpr.org/sites/default/files/homelessness-study.pdf.
220. KOHN, supra note 83; see also, Garnett, supra note 122, at 1–14 (describing the persistence
of broken windows theory in public zoning regulations).
221. See supra Part II.B.1; see also Kevin Francis O’Neill, Privatizing Public Forums to Eliminate Dissent, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 201, 202 (2007) (noting “the increasing obsolescence of
traditional public forums as a meaningful platform for citizen speech; and . . . the broad range of
governmental efforts to eliminate or privatize our traditional public forums”).
222. FISHER ET AL, supra note 17; NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 219; Olson &
MacDonald, supra note 15.
223. Open letter from Justin Keller, entrepreneur, developer and the founder of startup Commando.io, to San Francisco mayor, Ed Lee, and police chief, Greg Suhr (Feb. 15, 2015),
http://justink.svbtle.com/open-letter-to-mayor-ed-lee-and-greg-suhr-police-chief.
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for hours, days, weeks, or years without offending or upsetting another person who observes you doing these things in public? In fact, a significant
number of jurisdictions nationwide criminalize such conduct,224 even if (and,
as this Article suggests, especially because) you have no reasonable alternative due to lack of shelter.
For hundreds of years, the United States and other countries have used
laws and policies—purporting to protect public order—to move undesirable
people from sight and control access to public space.225 These laws are often
called “criminalization laws” because they prohibit or severely restrict the
ability of certain marginalized groups to exist in public space.226 Jim Crow,
Ugly laws, and Sundown Town laws are a few notorious examples of historical laws that criminalized the presence of people of color, disabled people,
and immigrants in public space.227 Criminalization laws thus function as a
form of banishment.228 Americans have since repealed these historical laws
as discriminatory, but many contemporary ordinances—similar in form and
function— are new hosts for the persistent influence of exile.229
A. The Contemporary Rise of Visible Poverty
The steady growth in the popularity of these laws correlates with the
steady increase in the number of visibly poor people throughout the country.
A 2016 report shows that, compared with peer countries, the United States
has the worst overall ranking on key poverty and inequality indicators.230

224. NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15.
225. Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3. For more on the history of regulating the presence of the poor,
see, for example, William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: Poor Laws in the Original Thirteen States,
31 U. RICH. L. REV. 111 (1997); William P. Quigley, Five Hundred Years of English Poor Laws,
1349–1834: Regulating the Working and Nonworking Poor, 30 AKRON L. REV. 73 (1996); William
P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 35
(1996).
226. See, e.g., BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 40; NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 18
(defining the criminalization of homelessness as prohibitions on “life-sustaining activities” that are
performed in public); Farida Ali, Limiting the Poor’s Right to Public Space: Criminalizing Homelessness in California, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 197 (2004); Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1996); John B.
Mitchell, Crimes of Misery and Theories of Punishment, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 465 (2012); Olson
& MacDonald, supra note 15; Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3; Waldron, supra note 83; Paul Ades,
Note, The Unconstitutionality of “AntiHomeless” Law: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1989); Antonia Fasanelli,
Note, In re Eichorn: The Long Awaited Implementation of the Necessity Defense in a Case of the
Criminalization of Homelessness, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (2000).
227. Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3.
228. BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 40.
229. Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3.
230. DAVID GRUSKY ET. AL, PATHWAYS, STATE OF THE UNION: THE POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY REPORT (2016), http://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Pathways-SOTU2016-2.pdf.
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Homelessness is a significant crisis nationwide. At least 600,000 people experience homelessness on any given night, including over 200,000 people in
families.231 Nearly 3.5 million Americans will experience homelessness this
year alone.232 In 2013, “an estimated 2.5 million children lived in run-down
motels, cars and shelters, on friends’ and relatives’ couches and on the
streets.”233 According to the latest U.S. Conference of Mayor’s report, the
number of homeless people in nineteen major cities increased over the last
year by an average of 1.6%, with 58% of surveyed cities reporting increases.234 Major cities such as Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle have recently declared homelessness as a state of emergency.235
But the problem has not always been this bad. Many agree that free
market theories, supply side economics, and anti-welfare ideologies in the
1980s fueled the swell of contemporary homelessness.236 The 1980s ushered

231. MEGHAN HENRY ET. AL, THE 2015 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR)
CONGRESS (Nov. 2015), https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2015-AHARPart-1.pdf. These “point in time” numbers are roundly criticized as underestimations. See, e.g.,
Paul Boden, Homeless Head Counts Help No One, S.F. GATE (Feb. 5, 2013, 7:26 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Homeless-head-counts-help-no-one4254191.php (“Point-in-time counts are a minimum number, always. They undercount hidden
homeless populations because homeless persons are doubling up with the housed or cannot be identified by sight as homeless.”).
232. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, HOW MANY PEOPLE EXPERIENCE HOMELESSNESS? 3
(Aug. 2007), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/facts/How_Many.pdf; NAT’L ALL. TO
END HOMELESSNESS, THE STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/the-state-of-homelessness-in-america-2015.
233. Joe Mozingo, No Room at the Inn for Innocence, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2015),
graphics.latimes.com/san-bernardino-motel (discussing Jon Queally, Study: More Homeless Children Now Than Any Point in U.S. History, COMMON DREAMS (Nov. 17, 2014)). The number of
homeless students in the United States recently reached a record national total of 1.36 million in the
2013–14 school year. Lyndsey Layton & Emma Brown, Number of Homeless Students in U.S. Has
Doubled Since Before the Recession, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2015), https://goo.gl/8BDTZC (noting
“student homelessness has risen steadily since 2009, continuing to rise even after the U.S. unemployment rate began falling and much of the country began recovering from the recession and the
housing crash that helped cause it”). City officials commonly identify the leading cause of homelessness among families as the lack of affordable housing, followed by poverty, unemployment, and
low-paying jobs. THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS
SURVEY: A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2 (Dec.
2015).
234. THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 233, at 2. Although approximately 42% of cities reported decreases over last year, during the same time period, emergency food
assistance requests rose by an average of 2.8% in more than half of surveyed cities. Fifty percent
of surveyed cities expected homelessness to rise “moderately” next year and 65% of cities expected
emergency food requests to “moderately” increase over the same time period. Id. at 1–2. Twentythree percent of requests for emergency food assistance in the cities surveyed went unmet. Id. at 1.
235. J.B. Wogan, Why Governments Declare a Homeless State of Emergency, GOVERNING THE
STATES AND LOCALITIES (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-when-cities-declare-a-homeless-state-of-emergency.html.
236. VINCENT LYON-CALLO, INEQUALITY, POVERTY, AND NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE:
ACTIVIST ETHNOGRAPHY IN THE HOMELESS SHELTERING INDUSTRY (2004); W. REG’L
ADVOCACY PROJECT, THE SYSTEMIC INADEQUACY OF BUSH’S HOMELESSNESS POLICY (2011).
TO
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in a devastating trifecta: First, Congress decimated funding for public housing construction and subsidization programs and they have never regained
their prior strength.237 Second, Congress severely undercut important mental
health programs, such as community mental health centers that were supposed to replace mental hospitals after deinstitutionalization.238 Third, social
welfare cuts blazed an unprecedented path to deeper poverty and homelessness for hundreds of thousands of people.239
Today, the majority of homeless people are forced to live in public. Virtually every major city lacks sufficient shelter to accommodate local homeless men, women, and children.240 This lack of shelter, combined with a
dearth of affordable housing,241 especially in aftershocks of the most recent
recession, means that several hundreds of thousands of Americans have no
reasonable alternative but to live in public spaces.242

237. CUSHING DOLBEARE, IRENE SARAF & SHEILA CROWLEY, CHANGING PRIORITIES: THE
FEDERAL BUDGET AND HOUSING ASSISTANCE 1976–2005 (2004).
238. Deinstutionalization refers to the release of large populations of mentally-disabled individuals who lacked stable residency upon discharge from mental institutions. See MICHAEL J. DEAR
& JENNIFER R. WOLCH, LANDSCAPES OF DESPAIR: FROM DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION TO
HOMELESSNESS (1987); David Cutler et al., Four Decades of Community Mental Health: A Symphony in Four Movements, 39 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 381 (2003); E.K. Sherl & A.D.
Schmetzer, Community Mental Health Centers Emergency Services in the 1980’s: Effects of Funding Changes, 25 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 267 (1989).
239. DEAR & WOLCH, supra note 238.
240. THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 233, at 2 (“Because no beds
were available for them, emergency shelters in 76 percent of the survey cities had to turn away
homeless families with children experiencing homelessness. Shelters in 61 percent of the cities had
to turn away unaccompanied individuals.”); NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 232, at
2 (noting that “a study of homelessness in 50 cities found that in virtually every city, the city’s
official estimated number of homeless people greatly exceeded the number of emergency shelter
and transitional housing spaces”).
241. The number of households in America who must devote more than fifty percent of their
income to rent will rise eleven percent by 2025. ANDREW JAKABOVICS ET. AL, PROJECTING
TRENDS IN SEVERELY COST-BURDENED RENTERS: 2015–2025, at 4 (2015). Housing cost-burdened
renters will rise from 11.8 million to 13.1 million. Id. “The nationwide lack of sufficient affordable
housing for poor households is well documented.” JOSH LEOPOLD ET AL., THE HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY GAP FOR EXTREMELY LOW-INCOME RENTERS IN 2013, at 2 (2015) (reviewing
available data and further examining “the affordability crisis” for extremely-low income renters);
see also NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. STUDY, OUT OF REACH (2015) (concluding there is no
place in the U.S. where “an individual working a typical 40-hour workweek at the federal minimum
wage [can] afford a one- or two-bedroom apartment for his or her family”).
242. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: ADVOCACY MANUAL
14, https://www.nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place_Advocacy_Manual (“Because many municipalities do not have adequate shelter space, homeless persons are often left with no alternative but
to sleep and live in public spaces.”).
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B. Criminalization as a Response to the Crisis of Visible Poverty
As the gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen,243 laws
that prohibit or severely restrict the presence of visibly poor people also continue to increase and intensify across the nation.244 Several studies detail the
extensive scope of the criminalization of homeless and visibly poor people,
so a detailed examination is not necessary here.245 But generally, the criminalization of visible poverty refers to measures that restrict life-sustaining
activities such as sleeping, camping, eating, sitting, seeking income, asking
for help, urinating, defecating, receiving food, storing belongings, or protecting oneself from the elements in public spaces—even when a person has no
reasonable alternative due to a lack of shelter or private space.246 Citywide
bans on such life-sustaining activities, combined with the increasing privatization of public space, means that the spaces in which visibly poor people are
permitted to legally exist are becoming smaller and smaller. Consequently,
visibly poor people are increasingly forced out of entire communities or they
face the threat of fines, arrest, or criminal penalties for engaging in acts necessary to survive.247
The defining feature of criminalization is the use of policing and the
criminal justice system as a first resort for responding to the public presence

243. COLIN GORDON, GROWING APART: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN INEQUALITY
(2014), http://scalar.usc.edu/works/growing-apart-a-political-history-of-american-inequality/index
(“Inequality is greater now than it has been at any time in the last century, and the gaps in wages,
income, and wealth are wider here than they are in any other democratic and developed economy.”);
see also Richard Fry & Rakesh Kochhar, America’s Wealth Gap Between Middle-Income and Upper-Income Families Is Widest on Record, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/17/wealth-gap-upper-middle-income/
(noting
“[t]he wealth gap between America’s high income group and everyone else has reached record high
levels since the economic recovery from the Great Recession of 2007–09”).
244. See FISHER ET AL., supra note 17; NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Olson & MacDonald,
supra note 15.
245. See BECKETT & HERBERT, supra note 40; FISHER ET AL., supra note 17; RACHEL A.
ADCOCK ET AL., TOO HIGH A PRICE: WHAT CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS COSTS COLORADO
(2016), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/homeless-advocacy-policy-project/2-16-16-Final-Report.pdf; NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Ali, supra note 226; Foscarinis, supra note 226; Mitchell,
supra note 226; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3, at 1; Waldron, supra note 83; Ades, supra note 226; Fasanelli, supra note 226.
246. See, e.g., NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; BECKETT
& HERBERT, supra note 40.
247. See, e.g., NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; BECKETT
& HERBERT, supra note 40. Violations can result in criminal charges or steep fines that poor people
inevitably are unable to pay. Unpaid fines often evolve into misdemeanor failure to pay or respond
to charges. See generally KATHERINE BECKETT ET AL., THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF
LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE (2008); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF
WASHINGTON & COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES, MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS: THE WAYS
COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR (2014), https://aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Modern%20Day%20Debtor's%20Prison%20Final%20(3).pdf.
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of visibly poor and homeless people.248 Because homeless people exist in
public space, the experience of homelessness itself makes interactions with
law enforcement more likely, especially the likelihood of being ticketed or
arrested.249 Enforcement-based approaches present risks to the well-being
and safety of homeless people by excluding them from safe spaces, fracturing
existing relationships with other people or services, or pushing them towards
more dangerous activities.250 Enforcement-based responses are also an expensive, resource-intensive use of police resources,251 and police officers are
not always equipped to deal with the complex health and social problems
bound up in the experience of homelessness.252
Dragging visibly poor people through the criminal justice system for
engaging in necessary, life-sustaining conduct does nothing to address the
underlying conditions that encourage homelessness and poverty. Instead,
criminalization exacerbates poverty and homelessness. The imposition of a
criminal history or insurmountable legal financial obligations severely diminishes a person’s chances of accessing employment, housing, and public
benefits.253 Accordingly, laws criminalizing homelessness create an expensive revolving door, continually worsening conditions for poor people and
draining cities’ fiscal resources.254 Indeed, studies consistently show that enforcement of criminalization laws is more expensive and less effective than
non-punitive alternatives, such as the provision of affordable housing, mental
health services, or substance abuse treatment.255
Cities frequently invoke public safety and health concerns—much of the
same justifications for historical laws such as Jim Crow—in defense of criminalizing visibly poor people.256 But studies do not support the proposition
that the criminalization of visible poverty does anything to advance public

248. See, e.g., BILL O’GRADY ET AL., CAN I SEE YOUR ID?: THE POLICING OF YOUTH
HOMELESSNESS
IN
TORONTO
(2011),
http://homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/CanISeeYourID_nov9.pdf.
249. Sylvestre & Bellot, supra note 3, at 1, 16 (discussing Canadian studies).
250. HERRING & YARBOUGH, supra note 219; FISHER ET AL., supra note 17.
251. Howard & Tran, supra note 16, at 6; Jeffrey Selbin et al., BERKELEY LAW POLICY
ADVOCACY CLINIC, DOES SIT-LIE WORK: WILL BERKELEY’S “MEASURE S” INCREASE ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY AND IMPROVE SERVICES TO HOMELESS PEOPLE? (2012); Adcock et al., supra note 245,
at 2.
252. See, e.g., Charles Gary, How to Police the Homeless, POLICE MAG. (June 1, 2004),
http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2004/06/how-to-police-the-homeless.aspx; Liza
Lucas, Changing the Way Police Respond to Mental Illness, CNN (July 6, 2015, 3:51 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/06/health/police-mental-health-training/.
253. NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 32–33.
254. Id. at 30.
255. Howard & Tran, supra note 16, at 24 (surveying national and statewide studies showing
the enforcement of criminalization laws is more expensive than the provision of non-punitive alternatives that better address the problems of homelessness).
256. NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 12; Ortiz & Dick, supra note 3, at 27.
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health and safety.257 Another frequent justification is economic stimulation,
however, no study shows a correlation between purging visible poverty and
an increase in the bottom line of area businesses; indeed, at least one study
proves there is no such relationship.258 Studies also disprove the argument
that criminalization actually helps poor people by engaging them with services.259 To the contrary, people experiencing homelessness often report extreme psychological and emotional trauma from constant societal rejection
and criminalization.260
C. The Persistence of Criminalizing Visible Poverty
Given such overwhelming evidence that criminalization is bad law and
policy, why are these measures increasingly enacted and aggressively enforced? The simple answer is the influence of exile. Society’s negative
views of poverty appear to drive some of these differences, both in terms of
the pronounced stigmatization of visibly poor people and in terms of the
law’s lack of responsiveness.261
In addition to social science suggesting that visibly poor people bear the
brunt of stigma against poor people generally,262 “popular culture abounds
with examples of glorified violence against the homeless and anti-homeless
sentiment.”263 Visibly poor people are frequent victims of hate crimes264 and
common victims of police harassment and brutality.265

257. See BLASI, supra note 91; HARCOURT, supra note 91; HERBERT, supra note 92; Fagan &
Davies, supra note 93.
258. Selbin et al., supra note 251, at 3.
259. Id.; see also Herring & Yarbough, supra note 219, at 47; RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., THE
VERA INSTITUTE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA (2015),
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report.pdf.
260. TAI DUNSON-STRANE & SARAH SOAKAI, DEP’T OF URBAN AND REG’L PLANNING UNIV.
OF HAWAII AT MANOA, THE EFFECTS OF CITY SWEEPS AND SIT-LIE POLICIES ON HONOLULU’S
HOUSELESS
(2015),
http://blog.hawaii.edu/durp/files/2015/06/Houseless-Honolulu-Report.small_.pdf; NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 232, at 25.
261. See supra Part I (explaining negative views of poverty).
262. See supra Part I.
263. Rankin, supra note 64, at 391 (reviewing examples).
264. NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, VULNERABLE TO HATE: A SURVEY OF HATE CRIMES
AND VIOLENCE COMMITTED AGAINST HOMELESS PEOPLE IN 2013 (Michael Stoops ed., June 2014),
http://nationalhomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Hate-Crimes-2013-FINAL.pdf.
265. See, e.g., Elliot Spagat, Video Released of San Diego Officer’s Shooting of Transient, MSN
NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/video-released-of-san-diego-officersshooting-of-transient/ar-BBnQNYC; Alan Pyke, Phoenix Cops Could Face Felony Charges For
Pepper Spraying a Homeless Woman and Lying About It, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 14, 2015, 3:07
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/12/14/3731777/phoenix-police-charged-lying/; Fernanda Santos, New Mexico: Officers to be Tried for Man’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/19/us/new-mexico-officers-to-be-tried-for-mans-killing.html?_r=0; Tobias Salinger, Florida Cop Shown Tossing Peanuts at Homeless Man, Laughing
with Deputies as Man Eats them Off Floor in Booking Video, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 27, 2015,
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Of course, evidence of societal hostility toward visible poverty does not
always manifest in violent ways. Many extra-legal efforts seek displacement
of visible poverty. Some urban design techniques have been described as
“weapons” that are used by “architects, planners, policy-makers, developers,
real estate brokers, community activists, neighborhood associations, and individuals to wage the ongoing war between integration and segregation.”266
Such techniques are commonly dubbed as the practice of “hostile” or “disciplinary” architecture, which uses design as a mechanism to reduce the presence of homeless people in urban centers.267 Recent examples include the
installation of spikes on ledges or behind doorways,268 sprinklers triggered
by evening movement on the steps of church entryways,269 multiple armrests
to divide sidewalk benches,270 and enormous jagged boulders on grassy medians.271 The use of hostile architecture often generates controversy, not just
because of its transparency, but sometimes because of its economic cost. Opponents point out, for example, that the finances spent to support hostile architecture could be redirected to support those in need instead of exclude
them.272 Similarly, some cities heavily invest in “one way” transportation
9:43 PM), http://a.msn.com/01/en-us/AAdzIOe?ocid=se; Robert Gebelhoff, A New York Police Union Asks Members to Take Photos of City’s Homeless, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/11/a-new-york-police-unionasks-members-to-take-photos-of-citys-homeless/.
266. Daniel D’Oca et al., The Arsenal of Inclusion and Exclusion, 17 MAS CONTEXT 54 (2013),
http://www.mascontext.com/issues/17-boundary-spring-13/the-arsenal-of-inclusion-and-exclusion/; see also Eric Jaffee, The Hidden Ways Urban Design Segregates the Poor, FAST CODE
DESIGN COMPANY (Aug. 12, 2014, 8:00 AM), www.fastcodesign/3034206/slicker-city/the-hiddenways-urban-design-segregates-the-poor.
267. See, e.g., Eric Jaffee, supra note 266; see also, Sara Schindler, Architectural Exclusion:
Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J.
1934 (2015).
268. Alex Andreou, Spikes Keep the Homeless Away, Pushing Them Further out of Sight,
GUARDIAN (June 9, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/09/spikes-homeless-london-metal-alcove-defensive-architecture-poverty; Deborah Hastings, Posh London Apartment Complex Puts Up Metal Spikes to Deter Homeless, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 7, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/posh-london-building-puts-spikes-homeless-article1.1820898.
269. Doug Sovern, Saint Mary’s Cathedral Drenches Homeless with Water, CBS S.F. (Mar. 18,
2015, 5:30 AM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2015/03/18/homeless-saint-marys-cathedralarchdiocese-san-francisco-intentionally-drenched-water-sleeping/.
270. Eric Jaffee, supra note 266.
271. Matt Driscoll, Throwing Rocks at Tacoma’s Homeless Problem Isn’t the Answer, NEWS
TRIB. (June 9, 2015), http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/matt-driscoll/article26298283.html.
272. Mary Vorsino, Homeless Face New City Tactic: Bus Stop Stools, HONOLULU ADVERTISER
(Oct. 27, 2008), http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2008/Oct/27/ln/ha waii810270333.html
(“So far, the city has spent about $11,000 on the seating initiative, removing benches and installing
55 stools at 12 bus stops in urban Honolulu and Kane’ohe. . . . Michael Stoops . . . said cities should
concentrate more on providing shelter and services for the homeless and less on moving them from
bus stops.”); Alex Andreou, Anti-homeless Spikes: ‘Sleeping Rough Opened My Eyes to the City’s
Barbed Cruelty’, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/feb/18/
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programs, designed to “solve” the problem of visible poverty by literally
shipping poor people elsewhere.273
Despite clear evidence of the pervasive stigmatization and marginalization of visibly poor and homeless people, equal protection analysis holds little promise.274 Poverty, by itself, is not a suspect classification that triggers
heightened judicial scrutiny.275 Other scholars have criticized the anemic
quality of equal protection jurisprudence for failing to ensure meaningful protection, access, and opportunity for poor and marginalized members of society.276
Although advocates sometimes successfully challenge these laws as violating the human, civil, and constitutional rights of visibly poor people, they
are often upheld despite evidence of their disproportionate impact on poor
and homeless populations; populations that are, in turn, disproportionately
comprised of other marginalized groups that are supposed to be afforded various legal protections.277 Courts frequently defer to governmental justifications such as public health and safety, without scrutinizing these justifications
for pretext and without requiring evidence of how criminalization measures
impact the health and safety of visibly poor people.278 In this permissive
space, the influence of exile supports the proliferation of laws that criminalize
people who have no reasonable alternative but to engage in necessary, lifesustaining activities somewhere in public.279 Consequently, criminalization
laws effectively punish people for experiencing homelessness.280

defensive-architecture-keeps-poverty-undeen-and-makes-us-more-hostile (noting that defensive or
hostile architecture “doesn’t even achieve its basic goal of making us feel safer”).
273. See, e.g., Eben Blake, Homeless Bus Ticket Programs Across the Nation Offer Little Accountability, Poor Housing Solutions, Activists Say, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 24, 2015, 7:34 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/homeless-bus-ticket-programs-across-nation-offer-little-accountabilitypoor-housing-2016812.
274. See Nice, supra note 64.
275. Harris v. McRae, for example, is commonly interpreted as Supreme Court precedent that
poor people are not a suspect class. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). However, other scholars persuasively
argue that the Supreme Court has not clearly addressed the suspect classification status of poor
people. See Nice, supra note 64.
276. See Nice, supra note 64; Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of An
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1720 (arguing for the “concept of
the ‘vulnerable subject’ as a more viable and appropriate figure around which to build contemporary
policy and law”).
277. NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 7 (surveying various cases and outcomes); Lurie &
Schuster, supra note 46 (establishing the disproportionate representation of other marginalized
groups in homeless populations).
278. See supra Part II.B.
279. For more on the lack of reasonable alternatives for poor and homeless people, see Fasanelli,
supra note 226.
280. See NAT’L LAW CTR., supra note 15; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 15; Statement of
Interest of the United States at 7, Bell v. Boise, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Idaho 2014) (Civ. Action
No. 1:09-cv-540-REB Hom.).
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As long as cities fail to adequately address the underlying causes of
homelessness, criminalization laws in those jurisdictions should be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court in Robinson
v. California281 held that laws that criminalize an individual’s status, rather
than specific conduct, are unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.282 Moreover, “certain acts also may not be
subject to punishment under the Eighth Amendment if they are unavoidable
consequences of one’s status.”283 Thus, if a law prohibits conduct that is unavoidable or “involuntary due to one’s condition, criminalization of that conduct would be impermissible” under the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.284 For example, the Department of Justice
recently clarified that conduct-versus-status analysis, which municipalities
routinely rely upon to justify enforcement of ordinances that criminalize
sleeping and camping in public, fails to pass Eighth Amendment muster when
inadequate shelter beds leave homeless individuals with no choice but to
sleep in public.285 This argument has found some limited success.286 But
there is no principled basis for limiting the Eighth Amendment’s application
to anti-camping laws; instead, this reasoning should apply to any criminalization law that punishes conduct that is a “universal and unavoidable consequence of being human” when that person has no reasonable alternative.287

281. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
282. Id. at 667 (holding that a state cannot punish a person for his or her status).
283. Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 280, at 7. The DOJ’s statement
provides a cogent review and synthesis of Robinson, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), and
other relevant Eighth Amendment challenges to anti-camping ordinances that have been enforced
against homeless individuals. The DOJ ultimately urged the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho to adopt the reasoning of Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.
2006), vacated after settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007), which found such ordinances unconstitutional because, in the face of insufficient shelter within the city, the laws criminalized essential, life-sustaining activities such as sitting, lying down, and sleeping even though homeless
individuals had no reasonable alternative than to perform such activities in public. Statement of
Interest of the United States, supra note 280, at 11, (noting that “punishing conduct that is a ‘universal and unavoidable consequence [] of being human’ violates the Eighth Amendment” (quoting
Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136)).
284. Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 280, at 7.
285. Id. at 11–14. In evaluating the constitutionality of anti-camping ordinances, courts may
consider the sufficiency of available shelter beds. When there is an insufficient number of beds
available to accommodate the local homeless population, courts may hold that a law criminalizing
sleeping in public is void as applied to a homeless defendant. See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232
F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding anti-camping ordinance because shelter beds available
on the night the defendant was cited); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D.
Fla. 1992) (holding in part, that enforcement of an anti-sleeping ordinance was cruel and unusual
punishment when insufficient shelter beds); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1155 (Cal.
1995) (upholding anti-camping ordinance in part because defendants failed to show whether shelter
beds were available); In re Eichorn, 69 Cal. App. 4th 382, 385 (1998) (considering insufficiency of
shelter beds in context of necessity defense).
286. See supra note 280, at 11–14.
287. Id. at 10 (quoting Jones, 444 F.3d at 1136); see also Fasanelli, supra note 226.
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As explained in this Section, laws that criminalize essential life activities for individuals experiencing homelessness do not promote public safety,
impose needless costs on prosecutorial, defense, and court services, and do
nothing to solve the underlying problems of poverty, homelessness, and mental illness. Instead of wasting significant amounts of money on criminalizing
visible poverty, governments should focus resources on non-punitive alternatives, such as providing housing and services.288 But, until the American
conscience confronts the human instinct to exile visibly poor people from
public space, criminalization laws and policies will persist and evolve.
IV. CONFRONTING THE INFLUENCE OF EXILE
Despite Americans’ insistence on egalitarianism, opportunity, and
classlessness, ‘there is an un-American secret at the heart of American culture: for a long time it was [and is] preoccupied by
class’ . . . . [W]e are acutely aware of class distinctions, and we
endorse the opportunity syllogism, which suggests that people attain the class status they deserve. We deride elites as out of touch,
but we do not notice that we are the elites of the world.289
The influence of exile is an invisible hand, guiding the enactment and
enforcement of laws that ensure and sustain inequalities to the advantage of
the more powerful.290 Public perceptions about whether an individual “deserves” rights, in turn, affect how the law allocates or restricts rights.291 The
unparalleled stigma reserved for the visibly poor explains not only the proliferation of criminalization laws, but also the lack of urgency in legal and
policy fixes.
Policymakers must confront the influence of exile. They should note
consistent evidence that criminalization laws are ineffective and expensive
when compared to non-punitive alternatives. They should review their laws
governing the use of public spaces and repeal any that express the influence
of exile. Additionally, jurisdictions that fail to adequately address the underlying causes of homelessness and visible poverty should desist from enforcing laws that criminalize conduct in which people must engage to survive.
288. Howard & Tran, supra note 16 (surveying national and statewide studies showing the enforcement of criminalization laws is more expensive than the provision of non-punitive alternatives
that better address the problems of homelessness).
289. FISKE, supra note 12, at 26 (footnote omitted) (quoting Nick Krafft, Class in American
Literature, OPEN ECONOMICS (Aug. 26, 2010), https://openeconomicsnd.wordpress.com
/2010/08/26/class-in-american-literature/).
290. See GREENWALD, supra note 24, at 7.
291. See, e.g., Burnstein, supra note 3, at 29; Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 3; see also GEORGE
ORWELL, Freedom of the Park, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM, AND LETTERS OF
GEORGE ORWELL 40 (1968) (“If large numbers of people are interested in freedom of speech, there
will be freedom of speech, even if the law forbids it; if public opinion is sluggish, inconvenient
minorities will be persecuted, even if laws exist to protect them.”).
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Even if policymakers deny these points and believe they can modify laws and
policies to both reduce visible poverty and avoid potential constitutional liability, they should take steps to mitigate the total waste of taxpayer dollars
caused by criminalizing behaviors that many poor people have no choice but
to repeat.
The judiciary must also better appreciate the influence of exile, particularly in application to visibly poor people. Courts should invalidate laws that
criminalize the conduct of necessary, life-sustaining conduct in public when
there is no reasonable alternative.292 Governmental justifications of public
health and public safety should be scrutinized and evaluated not only from
the perspective of privileged individuals, but also from the perspective of
poor people who are forced to live in public.293
But defending the visibility of poverty also plays a key role in confronting the influence of exile. Criminalization laws, by regulating and minimizing the visibility of poverty in public space, undermine the availability of
public space as a venue to protest. Persistent counter efforts must continue
to organize and challenge the influence of exile, claiming public space as a
venue for acts of civil disobedience and nonviolent political protest.294 “Public space is inherently political and potentially subversive; it is seen as both
the manifestation of reigning political power but also as that of a more inclusive power that can reclaim it temporarily by occupying it for political purposes.”295
Indeed, in this context, the mere existence of homeless people in public
space is an act of resistance.296 In Martin Luther King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail, Dr. King explained why visibility is key to protest:
Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and establish
such creative tension that a community that has constantly refused
to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize
the issue that it can no longer be ignored . . . . [T]he purpose of the
direct action is to create a situation so crisis-packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation.297

292. See supra Part III (discussing criminalization laws).
293. See supra Part II (discussing judicial deference in First Amendment cases) & Part III (discussing the same in criminalization cases generally).
294. Bodnar, supra note 98, at 2100 (advocating for marginalized groups to “reclaim public
space for uses that defy the dominant logic of the contemporary rearrangement of public space, and
point to its countercurrents”).
295. Id. at 2095.
296. TALMADGE WRIGHT, OUT OF PLACE: HOMELESS MOBILIZATIONS, SUBCITIES, AND
CONTESTED LANDSCAPES 182 (1997) (noting that, for marginalized populations, “[e]xistence is resistance”).
297. Letter from Martin Luther King Jr. to Bishop C. C. J. Carpenter et al. (Apr. 16, 1963)
(generally known as the “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”).

RankinFinalBookProof

52

10/31/2016 12:22 PM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 76:4

Thus, it is only when society cannot hide evidence of poverty, inequality, underfunded mental health services, and the lack of affordable housing
that society is forced to confront it. In order to effectuate a meaningful shift
in American laws and policies, the crisis of poverty must be visible in public
space.298 The presence of visible poverty forces society to confront inequality of income, education, health care, and criminal justice. Although confrontation with visible poverty may make more privileged people feel uncomfortable or even frightened, this dissonance is an essential form of protest, a
crucial method to influence public opinion and provoke social change.299 Impact litigation and legislative advocacy are slow, unsure, and even expensive
options; the visibility of people who are experiencing poverty and homelessness is a necessary and primary form of resistance.300 The presence of visible
poverty is a persistent message that can “scratch[] the psychological armor
of even those citizens who insisted that all those people on the street were
still the unworthy poor.”301
The peaceful occupation of public space then becomes its own sort of
tactical control that is both “adaptive and defiant.”302 Encampments and similar “strategies enabl[e] individuals to weave together survival and in some
cases social transformation”303; such forms of protest and resistance amount
to “an attempt by the homeless to provide themselves with the shelter, community, and dignity denied them by their social system.”304 Fighting displacement then creates a form of “insurgent citizenship, where those whose
status as legitimate members of the public is not yet fully established, but
where they nonetheless hold their ground and make claims of the legitimacy

298. Randall Amster & David Cook, Homelessness as Nonviolent Resistance 2009–2010, J. FOR
PEACE & CONFLICT 13, 13–14 (2009–2010) (noting “[t]he issue of homelessness
presents a unique moment in peace and social change praxis to unify both reactive survival aims
with proactive policy shifts, since it is precisely the continued existence of homeless ‘street people’
that often seems to represent one of the greatest ‘threats’ to business as usual” (citing WRIGHT,
supra note 296, at 182)).
299. KOHN, supra note 83, at 184 (“If the homeless do not have the opportunity to be visible in
public space, if they cannot communicate their needs, then there is no chance that they will convince
others to make the social changes necessary to meet these needs.”); Don Mitchell, Introduction:
Public Space in the City, 17 URB. GEOGRAPHY 127, 129 (1996) (“[D]issidents of all types must
continually assert their presence into public space, if they ever are to be seen and heard.”).
300. SUSAN RUDDICK, YOUNG AND HOMELESS IN HOLLYWOOD: MAPPING THE SOCIAL
IDENTITIES 64 (1996) (noting that homeless people manifest a form of resistance “simply by their
presence”); Don Mitchell, Political Violence, Order, and the Legal Construction of Public Space:
Power and the Public Forum Doctrine, 17 URB. GEOGRAPHY 152, 172 (1996) (“[I]t is essential that
activists continue to challenge restrictive rights-discourse not just in the courts, but also in the street,
where a more positive vision of a just society can be fought for.”).
301. BLAU, supra note 8, at 175.
302. WRIGHT, supra note 296, at 199, 266.
303. Lynn M. Harter et al., The Structuring of Invisibility Among the Hidden Homeless: The
Politics of Space, Stigma, and Identity Construction, 33 J. APPLIED COMM. RES. 305, 324 (2005).
304. RICHARD H. ROPERS, THE INVISIBLE HOMELESS: A NEW URBAN ECOLOGY 199 (1988).
THE STUDY OF
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of their presence.”305 Like most forms of protest, visible poverty creates discomfort because it challenges the status quo306; visible poverty as a form of
protest challenges the American conscience to grapple with its own complicity in creating the circumstances within which homelessness and poverty can
thrive.307
Current spatial-hierarchies not only undermine the viability of necessary
protest, they also frustrate the possibility of proximity and the understanding
that often comes with it. Proximity is necessary to create social change.308
Bryan Stevenson argues that the first thing we have to do to fight injustice is
to get proximate to injustice; we must show up and see things with our own
eyes.309 When we see injustice up close, Stevenson theorizes, we will have
no choice but to act.310 Just as importantly, Stevenson reminds us that viable
solutions can only be developed when one has an up-close view of a problem.
Accordingly, as long as the influence of exile shapes American laws and policies, it negatively affects the prospects of social change and justice.311
Perhaps the first step to really addressing homelessness is to examine
ourselves, as well as our reactions to visible poverty.
First, and fundamentally, we need to shift from the assumption that law
enforcement and the criminal justice system are the most appropriate mechanisms for dealing with the use of public space by people experiencing homelessness. Public attitudes toward visible poverty influence policymaking, law
enforcement, and juridical decisionmaking. Thus, connections between public attitudes and laws that govern the allocation of rights in public space warrant particular attention. Generally, laws, policies, and practices regulating

305. Neal, supra note 98, at 63 (discussing James Holston, Spaces of Insurgent Citizenship, in
CITIES AND CITIZENSHIP (A PUBLIC CULTURE BOOK) 155–73 (J. Holston ed., 1999)).
306. “[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart
of the existing order.” West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
307. Peter Marcuse, Neutralizing Homelessness, 1988 SOCIALIST REV. 69, 93 (1988) (“[H]omelessness is such a danger to the legitimacy of the status quo. Homelessness . . . may shock people
into the realization that homelessness exists not because the system is failing to work as it should,
but because the system is working as it must.”); Amster & Cook, supra note 298, at 14 (noting the
poor are a consequence of a competitive capitalist economy; “[t]herefore, their presence is problematic to those who believe in the ideals of Western capitalism”).
308. See BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2015).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. KOHN, supra note 83, at 8 (stating “the problem is that segregation itself makes it difficult
for members of privileged groups to recognize the existence of injustice” (citing Iris Marion Young,
Residential Segregation and Differentiated Citizenship, 3 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 242 (1999))). Kohn
adds, “Public space is made up of more than parks, plazas, and sidewalks; it is a shared world where
individuals can identify with one another and see themselves through the eyes of others. Seeing
oneself through the other’s eyes may be a first step towards recognizing one’s own privilege, and,
perhaps, criticizing structures of systematic privilege and deprivation.” Id. at 8–9.
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public space are not consciously created to punish visibly poor people for
their status or condition. However, this is often the impact.
Common reactions to visible poverty—discomfort, unease, disgust, and
anxiety—fuel the urge to exile. Especially as gentrification accelerates in
many urban centers, tensions over “appropriate” uses of public space also
intensify. A better understanding of common stereotypes relating to visible
poverty may help citizens and policymakers to more carefully distinguish between dangerous or aggressive behavior or merely perceived danger, a typical consequence of witnessing someone who seems to be in desperate circumstances. This reflection may also help us to better distinguish between
social, economic, and health-related problems and criminal ones. Laws and
policies governing the regulation of public space should respond to evidence
about crime and its consequences, not feelings of disgust over evidence of
human desperation or difference.
Currently, the law is too rigid with respect to the interpretation and understanding of popular attitudes toward visible poverty and how these perceptions influence the development of the law. For decades, various sciences
have established understanding of in-groups and out-groups as a form of social control; the law needs to be more cognizant of these instincts in evaluating laws and policies that affect visibly poor and homeless people. Understanding the influence of exile should prompt us to stop resorting to the use
of the criminal justice system as a first response to visible poverty. Confronting the influence of exile can allow us to consider more effective and efficient
responses that respect the rights of all people to exist in public space or, more
fundamentally, to exist at all.

